### TOP SECRET / RELEASABLE TO SOUTH AFRICA

MEMO NUMBER: N-0013/10

DATE:

28 SEPTEMBER 2010

SUBJECT:

POSSIBLE IMMINENT SHIPMENT OF YELLOWCAKE

TO IRAN BY ARMENIAN BROKER

TOP SECRET//REL TO SOUTH AFRICA

OHR SERVICE HAS BEEN INVESTIGATING THE ARMENIAN BROKER EFFORT TO PROCURE A LARGE AMOUNT OF YELLOWCAKE FOR IRAN. WE WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT WE RECENTLY RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT INFORMED HIS INTERMEDIARY IN IRAN THAT ON 19 SEPTEMBER HE WAS DEPARTING FOR TURKEY WHERE HE WOULD BE PREPARING "THE YELLOW GOODS" -- WE ASSESS THIS IS YELLOWCAKE -- FROM THE SAME COUNTRY WHERE IRAN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED 500 TONS, WHICH WE ASSESS IS SOUTH AFRICA.

OUR INFORMATION ALSO SUGGESTS THAT IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE THRETCH COMPANY THIS COMPANY IS APPARENTLY COLLOCATED WITH TWO OTHER COMPANIES. WAS RECENTLY NAMED AS WE ARE UNSURE IF VICE PRESIDENT OF THESE COMPANIES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH EFFORTS TO PROCURE YELLOWCAKE OR HIS OTHER ILLICIT PROCUREMENT FOR IRAN. WE REQUEST THAT YOU INVESTIGATE IF THESE TURKISH COMPANIES HAVE CONDUCTED BUSINESS IN YOUR COUNTRY, POSSIBLY FOR YELLOWCAKE.

WE ASSESS OUR INFORMATION MAY MEAN THAT THERE IS AN IMMINENT SHIPMENT OF YELLOWCAKE, POSSIBLY ORIGINATING IN YOUR COUNTRY, THAT IS BEING OR WILL BE SHIPPED THROUGH TURKEY AND ON ITS WAY TO IRAN. WE HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS POSSIBLE TRANSACTION AND WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST ANY INFORMATION YOUR SERVICE MAY HAVE ON THIS SHIPMENT. WE ALSO REQUEST THAT YOUR SERVICE NOT TAKE ANY ACTION TO DETAIN OR ARREST SHOULD HE ENTER YOUR COUNTRY, WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH OUR SERVICE. THANKS AND REGARDS.

TOP SECRET//REL TO SOUTH AFRICA

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DATE	22 OCTOBER 2012
REPORT NO.	9342
URGENCY	
SUBJECT	IRAN/NUCLEAR/PROGRAM STATUS

### MAIN POINTS

- 1. IRAN'S ENRICHMENT ABILITIES CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. THE
  QUANTITY OF MATERIAL ENRICHED TO 20% IS NOT INCREASING AT
  THIS STAGE AS SOME IS BEING CONVERTED TO NUCLEAR FUEL FOR
  TRR. IN ADDITION, IRAN IS MAKING GREAT EFFORTS TO
  ACTIVATE THE IR40 REACTOR (WHICH IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE
  MILITARY-GRADE PLUTONIUM) AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE
  ASSESS THAT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN BEFORE MID-2014.
- 2. ENRICHMENT: ACTIVITY AT THE KASHAN AND QOM SITES HAS EXPANDED TO A LIMITED EXTENT ONLY, APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF A LACK OF AVAILABLE CENTRIFUGES, BUT THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE RATE AND EFFICIENCY OF ENRICHMENT-APPROXIMATELY 230 KG URANIUM IS ENRICHED TO 5% PER MONTH, AND APPROXIMATELY 12 KG IS ENRICHED TO 20% PER MONTH.
- 3. IRAN HAS THUS FAR ACCUMULATED ABOUT 5,500 KG OF URANIUM ENRICHED TO 5% (AFTER ABOUT 1,500 KG WERE ALLOCATED FOR ENRICHMENT TO 20%) AND ABOUT 100 KG ENRICHED TO 20% (AFTER 75-100 KG WERE CONVERTED INTO NUCLEAR FUEL FOR TRR).

- 4. BESIDES ENRICHMENT, THE ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN (AEOI) IS FOCUSING ITS EFFORTS ON COMPLETING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE IR40 HEAVY WATER REACTOR IN ARAK, AND PUTTING IT INTO SERVICE DURING 2014. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION OF DUMMY FUEL FOR THE REACTOR AND PREPARATIONS TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR FUEL HAVE BEGUN.
- 5. WE UNDERSTAND THAT IRAN CONTINUES TO IMPROVE ITS
  ENRICHMENT ABILITIES, AND IS EVEN LIABLE TO ADVANCE THEM
  SIGNIFICANTLY WHEN THE ADVANCED IR2M OR IR4 CENTRIFUGES,
  CURRENTLY BEING RUN IN IN THE PILOT FACILITY IN NATANZ,
  ARE PUT INTO SERVICE.
- 6. EVEN THOUGH IRAN HAS ACCUMULATED ENOUGH 5% ENRICHED
  URANIUM FOR SEVERAL BOMBS, AND HAS ENRICHED SOME OF IT TO
  20%, IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE READY TO ENRICH IT TO
  HIGHER LEVELS. IT IS ALLOCATING SOME OF IT TO PRODUCE
  NUCLEAR FUEL FOR THE TRR, AND THE AMOUNT OF 20% ENRICHED
  URANIUM IS THEREFORE NOT INCREASING.
- 7. WE UNDERSTAND THAT IRAN IS MAKING EFFORTS TO PUT THE IR40 INTO OPERATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE ASSESS THAT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN BEFORE MID-2014. THIS REACTOR IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE ENOUGH MILITARY-GRADE PLUTONIUM FOR ONE BOMB PER YEAR, BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF A NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT (UNKNOWN IN IRAN), THIS PLUTONIUM WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BE USED FOR WEAPONS.
- 8. IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THERE IS CONTINUED R&D
  ACTIVITY AT SPND, UNDER THE IRANIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY,
  WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS INTENDED FOR ACCUMULATING KNOWHOW
  AND CREATING AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK IT WILL BE ABLE
  TO MAKE USE OF TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR FUEL, WHEN THE ORDER IS
  GIVEN.
- 9. BOTTOM LINE: THOUGH IRAN AT THIS STAGE IS NOT PERFORMING
  THE ACTIVITY NECESSARY TO PRODUCE WEAPONS, IT IS WORKING
  TO CLOSE GAPS IN AREAS THAT APPEAR LEGITIMATE SUCH AS

ENRICHMENT, REACTORS, WHICH WILL REDUCE THE TIME REQUIRED TO PRODUCE WEAPONS FROM THE TIME THE INSTRUCTION IS ACTUALLY GIVEN.

DETAILS

URANIUM ENRICHMENT TRACK

- 10. EXPANSION OF ACTIVITY AT THE NANTEZ AND QOM SITES HAS BEEN LIMITED (APPARENTLY DUE TO A LACK OF AVAILABLE CENTRIFUGES), BUT ENRICHMENT ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO EXPAND:
  - A. IN IRAN THERE ARE CURRENTLY 10,500 CENTRIFUGES OPERATING, AS FOLLOWS:
    - (1) ABOUT 9,000 CENTRIFUGES OPERATE AT THREE ENRICHMENT UNITS IN A BUNKER IN NATANZ AND ENRICH TO 5%.
    - (2) ABOUT 700 CENTRIFUGES OPERATE IN THE ABOVE-GROUND PILOT FACILITY IN NATANZ, OF WHICH ABOUT 350 ENRICH TO 20% AND ABOUT 350 ADVANCED CENTRIFUGES ARE CURRENTLY RUNNING AND BEING FED WITH DEPLETED URANIUM.
    - (3) ABOUT 700 CENTRIFUGES OPERATE IN QOM AND ENRICH TO 20%.
  - B. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE ANOTHER 1,000 CENTRIFUGES
    INSTALLED THAT HAVE NOT BEEN PUT INTO OPERATION IN
    THE FOURTH UNIT IN NATANZ AND OTHER CASCADES IN QOM.
  - C. IN NATANZ: IN RECENT MONTHS INSTALLATION HAS BEGUN OF CENTRIFUGES AT THE SITE. IN ADDITION, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN ENRICHMENT TO A LOW LEVEL, FROM ABOUT 170 KG A MONTH IN FEBRUARY TO ABOUT 230 KG A MONTH IN MAY. THIS IS APPARENTLY A RESULT OF STABILIZATION OF ENRICHMENT IN THE THIRD UNIT.
    - D. IN QOM: NO NEW CENTRIFUGES HAVE BEEN PUT INTO OPERATION AT THE SITE SINCE JANUARY 2012 (ABOUT 700

ENRICHING CENTRIFUGES). APPARENTLY INSTALLATION OF CENTRIFUGES AT THE SITE HAS BEEN COMPLETED (ABOUT 2,800 CENTRIFUGES.)

- 11. IRAN NOW HAS ABOUT 5,500 KG OF MATERIAL ENRICHED TO 5%

  (AFTER ABOUT 1,500 KG WAS ALLOCATED FOR 20% ENRICHMENT)

  AND ABOUT 100 KG OF MATERIAL ENRICHED TO 20% (AFTER ABOUT 75-100 KG OF URANIUM ENRICHED TO 20% WAS CONVERTED INTO NUCLEAR FUEL TO OPERATE THE RESEARCH REACTOR IN TEHRAN),

  PRODUCED AT A RATE OF ABOUT 12 KG A MONTH (SIMILAR TO THE RATE OF USE CURRENTLY MADE OF THE MATERIAL TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR FUEL).
- 12. R&D OF ADVANCED CENTRIFUGES: THERE HAS BEEN AN ADVANCE IN THE STABILIZATION OF MODEL IR-2M, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO IMPROVE THE ENRICHMENT ABILITY OF THE IRANIAN CENTRIFUGES THREEFOLD. THIS IS AFTER IT HAS BEEN OPERATED IN THE R&D CASCADE IN THE PILOT FACILITY IN NATANZ, WHERE IT APPEARS THAT IR-2M IS MORE READY THAN THE IR-4 TO START INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION.

### PLUTONIUM TRACK

- 13. ALONG WITH THE ENRICHMENT, AEOI IS FOCUSING ITS EFFORTS
  ON COMPLETING THE BUILDING OF THE HEAVY WATER REACTOR IN
  ARAK (IR40) AND ACTIVATING IT DURING 2014. IN THIS
  CONTEXT:
  - A. IN APRIL 2012, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION WAS BEGUN OF DUMMY FUEL, INTENDED FOR TESTING THE REACTOR WITHOUT A NUCLEAR REACTION. ITS COMPLETION WILL ALLOW IRAN TO START TESTING THE REACTOR IN 2013.
  - B. IRAN IS PREPARING TO INCREASE THE RATE OF PRODUCTION OF POWDER REQUIRED TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR FUEL (UO2) AND IN FEBRUARY 2012 PRODUCTION OF PELLETS BEGAN (THE FIRST STAGE OF PRODUCING NUCLEAR FUEL). HOWEVER, IT SEEMS THAT SPECIAL EQUIPMENT IS MISSING WHICH IS

NECESSARY FOR BEGINNING OPERATION OF THE PRODUCTION LINE.

14. WHEN THE REACTOR BEGINS OPERATING, PRODUCTION OF
PLUTONIUM WILL BEGIN AT A QUANTITY SUFFICIENT TO PRODUCE
ONE BOMB A YEAR, BUT THERE WILL BE NO USE FOR THE WEAPONS
AS LONG AS THERE IS NO NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT.

### WEAPONS

- 15. UNTIL 2003 THERE WAS A SET NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN IRAN FOR R&D OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE IRANIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY WHICH WAS CALLED THE AMAD PLAN. THE PLAN WAS REDUCED FOLLOWING EXPOSURE OF THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND CONCERN ABOUT MILITARY ATTACK.
- 16. IN 2011, MANY SCIENTISTS FROM THE AMAD PROGRAM FORMED AN ORGANIZATION CALLED SPND, ALSO UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. AT THE HEAD OF THE ORGANIZATION IS MOHSEN FAKHRIZADEH, FORMER HEAD OF AMAD.
- 17. THE ORGANIZATION WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSES OF PRESERVING THE TECHNOLOGICAL ABILITY AND THE JOINT ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF IRANIAN SCIENTISTS IN THE AREA OF R&D OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND FOR THE PURPOSES OF RETAINING THE SKILLS OF THE SCIENTISTS. THIS IS ALLOW RENEWAL OF THE ACTIVITY NECESSARY TO PRODUCE WEAPONS IMMEDIATELY WHEN THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP DECIDES TO DO SO.
- 18. KIND REGARDS.

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#### SECRET

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DATE AUGUST 2010

REPORT NO. 5896

SUBJECT MACOPA MISSILE PLANS - RESPONSE

- 1. FURTHER TO YOUR REQUEST REGARDING THE MACOPA MISSILE
  AFFAIR, PLEASE NOTE THAT OUR SERVICE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO
  CARRY OUT INVESTIGATIONS ON ISRAELI TERRITORY.
- 2. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF THE STRONG COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR SERVICES, AND OUR SINCERE DESIRE TO ASSIST YOU, WE HAVE EXAMINED WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN, AT LEAST, RETURN THE MISSILE PLANS TO YOU.
- 3. SINCE, ACCORDING TO THE INFORMATION YOU RELAYED TO US, AN ISRAELI CITIZEN, MR. YITZHAK TALIA, IS INVOLVED IN THIS AFFAIR, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING CONFIRMATION FROM THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY THAT THE ISRAELI CITIZEN WILL NOT BE PROSECUTED OR INVOLVED IN LEGAL ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA CONCERNING THIS AFFAIR, BEFORE WE RELAY THE PLANS TO YOU.
- 4. PLEASE NOTE THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR COOPERATION, THE INFORMATION WE WILL RELAY TO YOU ABOUT THIS MATTER IS

PAGE 1 OF 1

CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE USED IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.

5. THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION. REGARDS.

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PAGE 2 OF 2



# **OPERATIONAL TARGET ANALYSIS**

January 2010

ALJAZEERA



National Intelligence Agency

# IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (MOIS)

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# ALJAZEERA

### **IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE**

### MOIS - LS 885

### **OPERATIONAL TARGET ANALYSIS**

### 1 INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) or Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar (VEVAK), is the successor agency to the SAVAK that exited in the times of the Shah of Iran in the pre-1979 period. After the Islamic revolution in 1979 SAVAK was briefly known by the acronym SAVAMA, but after a reorganisation of the security structures the present Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) was created in 1984 as the foreign intelligence service of Iran.
- 1.2 The Islamic government's keen desire at that time to gain an upper hand over leftist guerrilla organisations even led to a relaxation of their previously unrelenting pursuit of military intelligence personnel. Key religious leaders, including then Speaker of the National Assembly (Majlis), Mr Hashemi-RAFSANJANI, insisted on recalling former agents to help eliminate domestic opposition.
- 1.3 Consequently, some intelligence officers and low-ranking SAVAK and army intelligence officers were asked to return to government service because of their specialised knowledge of eg the Iranian Leftist movements. Some former SAVAK intelligence collection operations were also turned over to MOIS during this time, despite the fact that the ideological/religious underpinnings of the new agency were radically different from its imperial predecessor.
- 1.4 With a large budget and extensive organisation, the MOIS is one of the most powerful ministries in the Iranian Government. In terms of the constitution MOIS is responsible for the collection and assessment of information and more importantly the suppressing of conspiracies that could endanger the country. MOIS operatives are either attached diplomats in Iranian embassies and Consulate Offices or as representatives of the Ministry of Guidance and propaganda. Non-official covers include Iran Air, students, merchants, mechanics, shopkeepers, bank clerks and members of Iranian opposition groups.
- 1.5 The MOIS has traditionally operated under the guidance of the *Velayat-e Faqih* ("Islamic Rule") apparatus of the religious leadership of Ayatollah Ali Hoseini KHAMANEI, but was under the direct control of President KHATAMI when he first became president in 1997. This has now changed and the MOIS has found it increasingly part of the power play between the political and clerical authorities. The latter have assumed direct control and the Minister of Intelligence and Security, Ali YOUNESI now reports directly to Ayatollah KHAMANEI and not to President KHATAMI.
- 1.6 During May 1998 the Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali KHAMENEI, ordered the then former Iranian Minister of Intelligence, Ayatollah Najaf ABADI, to "revive the export of the Iranian revolution". Senior Iranian intelligence officials consequently decided:
  - To increase the activities of the Iranian foundations and cultural associations abroad, eg the Mustadafin Foundation, and
  - That Iranian embassies across the world should more vigorously pursue the establishment of cultural centres.

During an address to officials of Iran's Intelligence Ministry on 27 August 2000, it was once again stressed that the intelligence officials must take into account the viewpoints of Imam KHOMEINI and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali KHAMANEI as the criteria for their activities.

### 2. DRIVING FORCES OF IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

- 2.1 The basis of Iran's foreign policy is described in Article 152 of the Iranian Constitution as the "Preservation of independence...its territorial integrity, and the defence of the rights of all Muslims". It is based on the former Supreme Religious Leader, Ayatollah KHOMENI's concept of the Velayt-e-Faqih (the Supreme Religious Guardian), or the right of clerics to rule over the Islamic community. This implies enforcing absolute authority over the populace, and extending this authority to all Muslims, eg "exporting the revolution" to support their co-religious supporters abroad.
- 2.2 According to the Iranian interpretation Muslims throughout the world constitute a single community the Ummah that must be ruled by a single government. The mullahs of Iran assert that by virtue of the 1979 revolution that they have acquired the status of "guardians" of all Muslims throughout the world. While this is a key principle a shift has occurred and Iran increasingly tend to be more pragmatic. It has long been willing to sacrifice some of its revolutionary / religious ideals to realise its national interests, which are increasingly dominant. It has curtailed its relations with Islamic movements which intend to overthrow governments (although Iran has kept its lines / networks open) and has shown a preference for working with other governments.
- 2.3 According to Pres KHATAMI these "driving forces" entail three elements, namely:
  - A "dialog between civilizations" on the international level
  - Détente with neighbouring states
  - The establishment and broadening of international contacts via the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).
- 2.4 The Teheran Times reported on 19 May 2004 that Intelligence Minister Ali YUNESI criticised the BUSH administration's regional policies, labelling US Middle East policy as a complete failure. YUNESI alleged that US officials make flawed decisions about the Middle East: "This is due to their excessive pride in their military power, which has led to military approaches being given priority over political and security approaches."

  [www.janes.com dd. 19 May 2004]
- 2.5 Iran's endeavours to become a nuclear power is severely influencing its relations with the international community. At the end of November 2004 Iran agreed with the UN to a full freeze of all nuclear enrichment activities that could make uranium for atomic weapons. This made Iran for the time being temporary safe from UN sanctions. This however creates the possibility that Iran could endeavour to obtain highly enriched uranium form other sources in covert ways.

Iran on 2006/01/10 ended a two-year voluntary suspension of nuclear research work by breaking seals on nuclear facilities that had been put in place by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. In Vienna, an IAEA spokeswoman confirmed that a seal at the nuclear enrichment facility near Natanz had been broken. On 10 January 2006 the European Union expressed its "grave concern" at Iran's resumption of research work on nuclear fuel, saying the move was in breach of Teheran's international commitments.

"We are very disappointed that Iran has not listened to international appeals ... this makes the situation very grave," Cristina GALLACH, spokeswoman for E.U. foreign policy chief Javier SOLANA, told Deutsche Presse-Agentur, dpa. GALLACH said the Iranian decision marked a

"violation" of the Paris agreement by Teheran to suspend nuclear activities since the new steps were "clearly related to enrichment. She added that E.U. governments were consulting each other as well as the United States and Russia on further steps.

A meeting of Britain, France and Germany - as well as Solana - could be held in Berlin later this week. The three European nations have been leading international efforts to seek out a diplomatic solution to the nuclear problem with Iran. Source: Sapa-dpa /fws: Date: 10 Jan 2006 14:08 in NIA Daily News Brief: 2006/01/11.

SA Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana DLAMINI-ZUMA, on 11 January 2006 told Ms Condoleezza RICE, US Secretary of State, that nuclear discussions with Iran should continue. In response to an Iranian call for a stronger role for South Africa in the nuclear talks, the US envoy said her government was in contact with Iran and the EU. DLAMINI-ZUMA said that South Africa would support a decision on the issue by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Source: SABC, dd. 12 January 2006; Pretoria News, p5 dd. 12 January 2006 in NIA Daily News Brief:

#### 3. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Africa is not high on Iran's list of foreign policy priorities. Iranian policy on Africa focuses on the expansion of Islam in East and West Africa, as well as promoting its economic interests in Southern Africa. Pres KHATAMI's economic policy focuses on the increased development and export of Iran's natural gas reserves. Iranian embassy activities in African countries, like Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar, the DRC, Zimbabwe and South Africa, reflect its normal modus operandi in the form of involvement in the spread of the "Islamic revolution". Iran uses its embassies to establish "cultural contact" with host countries by, eg opening cultural centres and accrediting "cultural attaches"

#### SOUTH AFRICA AND IRAN'S BILATERAL INTERESTS 4

- South Africa's interests / involvement in Iran is multifold. It is motivated by political, economic, geo-political and intelligence links as well as the Iranian multinational initiative of a "Dialogue between Civilizations". In specific terms these reasons are as follows:
  - Iran maintained relations with both the Apartheid government and the former Liberation Movements.
  - Iran serves as an excellent land bridge between the Indian Ocean littoral and the growing markets of Central Asia.
  - It is a leading member in the Islamic world and plays an important role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
  - Iran's "Dialogue between Civilization" is geared to inter alia create greater cooperation between Africa and Iran.
  - It is a major oil producing country and a key supplier of oil to South Africa.
  - Iran and South Africa regularly work together in multilateral fora such as the UN and NAM while cooperation in terms of NEPAD has also been enhanced. Iran has acknowledged the commitment of the SA Government to develop NEPAD and has declared its willingness to participate actively in all NEPAD activities. furthermore has created a NEPAD Desk in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that has the responsibility for direct interaction with the NEPAD Secretariat.

- 4.2 From Iran's side its relations with South Africa are perceived to be "good and suitable". The key focus areas:
  - > The expansion of bilateral ties.
  - Advancing the concept of "Dialogue between Civilizations".
  - Cooperation to counter US dominance, particularly given Iran's inclusion in a group of countries, labelled by the US as the "axis of evil". The other countries are/were North Korea and previously also Iraq.

### 5. IRAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

- Prior to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, South Africa and Iran maintained formal relations at the level of Consulate General and had good relations in fields of trade, science, technology, defence, medicine, energy and mining. After the revolution Iran severed all relations with South Africa in February 1979 and imposed a total trade boycott against South Africa. It only re-established contact with South Africa in 1994 when international trade and economic sanctions were lifted against South Africa.
- 5.2 The main focus of South Africa's bilateral relations with Iran is based on trade and investment. South Africa's principal import from Iran is crude oil, which represents approximately 96% of all of South Africa's imports from Iran and about 40% of all South Africa's oil needs. Due to these facts the trade balance is heavily in favour of Iran.
- Relations between Iran and South Africa are "regulated" by the Iran-South Africa Joint Bilateral Commission, which was established in 1995. The development of relations centred on this Commission. Iran's relations with Africa developed through the Iran-Africa Co-operation Forum, which also play a crucial role in the formulation of Iran's relations with South Africa. Visits by delegations of both Iran and South Africa also play an important role and take place on a regular basis. The next Iran-Africa Co-operation Forum is to be held in Iran in 2005.
- During the 7<sup>th</sup> Iran-South Africa Joint Bilateral Commission, that took place from 21-22 July 2003, progress was reviewed in the mutual relations. Two working groups facilitated this process namely, the Political and Social Working Group and the Economic and Technical Working Group. The following agreements / memoranda of Understanding (MOU) were signed:
  - MOU on Standards
  - MOU between PetroSA and the National Petrochemical Company of Iran
  - Draft Agreement on Extradition
  - Draft Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
  - MOU on co-operation in Women' Affairs.
  - MOU on Combating of Illicit Drug Trafficking
  - Programme of Cooperation (POC) on Health
  - Programme of Cooperation (POC) on Culture
- 5.5 According to a Memorandum of Understanding between SA and Iran that was to be signed in July 2003, the SA national oil company PetroSA and the Iranian National Oil Company were to work together on a "gas-to-liquid" project. Iran and South Africa were working together on joint feasibility studies in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors. The Understanding further covers trade, science, cultural, political and social sectors. (Business Day 16/07/2003)

### 5.6.1 OTHER AGREEMENTS/MOUS CONCLUDED SINCE 1995

- The Joint Co-operation Agreement (15 August 1995)
- MOU on co-operation in the fields of mining and minerals (19 Sept 1995)

- Trade Agreement (01 October 1996)

- Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (03 Nov 1997)

- Avoidance of double taxation Agreement (03 Nov 1997)

- Agreement regarding merchant shipping and related maritime matters (11 April 1999)

- Agreement on Scientific and Technological Co-operation (31 May 2000)

- MOU on Tourism Co-operation (22 August 2000)

- MOU on Sport Co-operation (22 August 2000)

- Terms of Reference Memorandum on Agricultural Co-operation (22 August 2000)

- MOU on Heath Co-operation (05 February 2002). Teams were being set up in the health and pharmaceutical sectors to oversee the development of new products. (Business Day – 16/07/2003)
- 5.7 It has further been reported that a delegation of the SA Department of Science and Technology visited Iran early 2004. The purpose was to develop project proposals in the field on nanotechnology. Progress has also been made with cooperation regarding laser and biotechnology. A certain in SA regarding nanotechnology.

  at the CSIR, is also involved). Deputy Director Moeketsi MODISENYANE of the Department of Foreign Affairs facilitated the visit. (24/06/2004).
- 5.8 Iran's export of the Islamic revolution to South Africa focuses on the following:
  - Iran wants to increase its influence abroad by exporting Shiite Islam and recruiting students for studies at Iranian institutions and simultaneously wants to counter the Sunni influence in South and Southern Africa
  - Using students that previously underwent religious training or military training in Lebanon for covert collection and espionage activities. South African students also received religious training in Iran.
  - Front companies to disguise revolutionary Islamic activities are being utilised by these students to radically influence the Islam communities in many African countries. A front company, the Ah-Iul Bait Foundation, an Iranian NGO, is also active in the Western Cape.
- 5.9 The following SA companies are active were active in Iran in 2003:

COMPANY	FIELD OF ACTIVITY	
Bateman	Mining	
Bayer DSA Chemicals	Chemicals	
Ernest & Young	Consultants	
Global Railway	Railway parts	
Hall & Longmore (Pty)	Steel construction	
Klein Karoo Co-op	Ostrich farming	
MINTEK	Manganese	
PETROSA	Petroleum	
SASA	Sugar	
SAMTEM (Pty) Ltd	Ferro alloys	
SASOL	Gas-to-liquid process	
Standard Bank	Financing	

6. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Teheran Times reported on 19 May 2004 that Intelligence Minister Ali YUNESI has stated that Iran is one of the safest countries in the Middle East. YUNESI said that the operational policies of the Intelligence Ministry have been institutionalised and are no longer liable to change when personnel shift. In discussing his ministry's activities YUNESI commented, "Its policies are in accordance with law and it is accountable to the people, high-ranking officials and the Majlis". YUNESI added that the Ministry of Intelligence is proud of its role in contributing to the nation's progress by providing domestic security.

The Iranian intelligence community comprises of the following structures:

6.1 The National Security Supreme Council (NSSC)

The Council serves as the Supreme Body of Intelligence and Security of Iran. It controls and coordinates the activities of the all intelligence structures in Iran and has the following objectives:

- Preservation of Iran's sovereignty
- Defence of the national identity
- Management and consolidation of internal and foreign policy
- Coordination and control of the intelligence and security service.
- 6.1.1 The NSSC comprises of the:
  - President
  - Speaker of Parliament (Majilis)
  - Minister of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
    - Minister of Foreign Affairs
  - Minister of Interior
  - Head of the Judiciary
  - Chief of Staff of Armed Forces
  - Head of Plan and Budget
  - Two representatives of the Supreme Leader (Spiritual Leader Ali KHAMENEI).
- 6.1.2 A number of sub-committees operate within the framework of the Council and deal with matters such as internal security, defence, economic affairs, social affairs and intelligence affairs. Each of the committees serves in a liaison and coordination capacity between the Council and the relevant professional organisations.
- 6.2 The Ministry of Islamic Guidance
- 6.2.1 This Ministry is responsible for the dissemination of the principles of the Iranian Revolution inside and outside the country and for intelligence collection. The Ministry operates abroad through Islamic Mosques and Islam Centres run by the Ministry's envoys from Iran. It is especially active in Africa where there are large Muslim communities and a small number of Iranian Embassies. Ministry envoys send Muslims from their countries of residence for courses in Iran when returning, guide their activities within their own communities.
- 6.3 The Ministry of Interior
- 6.3.1 The Ministry of Interior is responsible for order and security in the country and is/was in command of the Police, the Gendarmerie and the Komiteh. It is tasked with:
  - Law and order and other security matters in rural areas;

- Security of airports, harbours and national strategic key points, as well as traffic control:
- Safeguarding moral and religious values of the Iranian society.

### 6.4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

- 6.4.1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperates in the collection of intelligence through its diplomatic activities in foreign countries. Foreign Affairs officials (diplomats) also have the responsibility of contact with revolutionary Islamic movements and organisations. The Department/Directorate of Investigation and Studies (known as Department 220) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is exclusively involved in intelligence activities and operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Its tasks are the:
  - Spotting and running of human sources;
  - Collection of political information;
  - Preparation and execution of operations that are mainly directed at the elimination of hostile anti-Iranian elements abroad;
  - Assistance to elements that are engaged in subversive and terrorist activities.

### 6.5 Military Intelligence

- 6.5.1 The Military Intelligence Service developed considerably during the Iran-Iraq war and it consists of two operational intelligence arms, namely collection of positive intelligence and counter intelligence. Military Intelligence collection focus on:
  - Collecting military intelligence inside and outside the country;
  - Infiltration operations inside and outside the country;
  - COMINT operations abroad, as well as air and marine operations in the Persian Gulf;
  - Interception of international information (radio) (SIGINT).
  - Liaison with other Iranian intelligence structures and technical assistance.
- 6.5.2 The counter intelligence arm is responsible for the prevention of coups, subversion and foreign espionage. It operates internally and externally with agents and collaborators in every sector of the Iranian Army as well as in Iranian Embassies abroad.

### 6.6 The Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran)

6.6.1 The Revolutionary Guard Corps is the main foreign intelligence arm of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It has two departments with specific functions, namely:

### - The Special Operations Department

It is responsible for special operations abroad, including assassinations of Iranian dissidents

### The Chief Information Department

It is responsible for

- Maintaining contact with foreign Islamic groups;
- Rendering assistance to Muslims and Muslim countries;
- Preparing, training and running Shiite military personnel and non-Iranian volunteers for various operational missions in the Middle East.

- 6.7 The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
- 6.7.1 The MOIS is the main professional intelligence body in Iran and was established in 1984. It has extensive powers, especially after constitutional reforms in 1988, which rendered extra functions to this Ministry.
- 6.7.2 In the monitoring of Iranian intelligence activities internationally and locally, it became evident that the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is utilized to spread radical objectives. It was reported during 1998 that MOIS was focusing more aggressively on South Africa than ever before, with the anticipated purpose to establish a base from which it can direct its activities into the rest of Africa. Iran's activities since then exploited South Africa's open-door policy; abused lenient border control measures and freedom of religion; abused diplomatic immunity; and uncontrolled liaison/contact to further the cause of Iran.
- 6.7.3 In 2001 it was reported by LS 825 that the MOIS's activities abroad declined/eroded in status to that of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (*Pasdaran*). It however works in close cooperation with the Revolutionary Guard and members assist in providing weapons for actions abroad.

### 7. STRUCTURE OF THE MOIS

7.1 The exact structure of the MOIS is unknown. It is however known that it consists of four Main Directorates or Branches (numbered from 12-15). They are:

### DIRECTORATE 12: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS Responsibility:

- \* To orientate all organisations in Iran, including political parties, cultural organisations, enterprises and other Ministries.
- \* The falsification of papers and documentation related to the MOIS.

The Department of Counter Revolution is part of this Directorate, which controls the activities of the Mujaheddin.

## DIRECTORATE 13: ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE Responsibility:

- \* Follow-up work and the planning of attacks on opposition elements abroad. It coordinates its activities with Branch 15. The Branch 13 representative/member usually resorts under the command of the Branch 15 member
- \* The falsification of non-Iranian papers and documents, eg Iraqi bank notes.

# DIRECTORATE 14: COUNTER ESPIONAGE Responsibility:

- \* The monitoring of foreigners and students recruited for studies in Iran
- \* The running of double agents against primarily Western services. (Remark: The MOIS utilises volunteers to observe other intelligence operatives.)
- \* The foiling of subversive actions mainly in Iran.

# DIRECTORATE 15: FOREIGN 12 INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS Responsibility:

- \* HUMINT collection activities abroad for the:
  - Procurement of sensitive technology
  - Connection with foreign intelligence services
  - Execution of subversive actions abroad.

It is divided along functional and international geographical areas. The following Departments fall under Directorate 15:

- Department 112 Analysis of chemical and nuclear armaments information and other technical and scientific matters.
- Department 113 Analysis of information on matters regarding enterprises. (These two departments were formerly known as Directorate 11).
- Department 151 Iraq
- Department 152 Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan and Syria.
- Department 153 Afghanistan, Algeria, Far East, India, Pakistan and Turkey.
- Department 154 North America and Europe
- Department 155 Special Operations. (Has specially trained teams and works closely with the Revolutionary Committees)
- Department 156 Recruitment of MOIS members for Directorate 15
- Department 157 United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Barhain
- Department 158 Saudi Arabia

**DIRECTORATE 17: OVERSIGHT OF SCIENTIFIC ORGANISATIONS** 

DIRECTORATE 19: HUMAN RESOURCES

### DEPARTMENT INTERNAL SECURITY

### Responsibility:

It functions separately from the other Directorates and is directly responsible to the Minister. It has officers in all MOIS Departments doing clandestine surveillance on colleagues.

### UNIVERSITY OF IMAN BAJR

### Responsibility:

Training. A four-year training course is presented covering intelligence studies, tradecraft, language training, Islamic science, history and sociology.

### 8. MAIN FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MOIS

The espionage threat posed by Iran should be seen within the framework of its attempts to consolidate its strategic position in the Middle East and the Russian Caucuses region through eg bilateral cooperation with Russian, India and Saudi Arabia. Attempts to get

access to foreign technology for reverse engineering to strengthen its economy, forms part of this endeavour. Iranian visiting delegations to military and technology research projects in other countries should therefore be viewed with suspicion. The main responsibilities/tasks of the MOIS are to:

Defend the Iranian Government by imposing the "Islamic Rule" in Iran. This implies enforcing absolute authority over the populace.

Extend this absolute authority to all Muslims by "exporting the Iranian revolution". This is inter alia be done by assisting in the expansion of the Iranian revolutionary ideals through the infiltration and influencing of local communities in foreign countries.

Support and enhance Iran's foreign policy.

Monitor foreign citizens residing (or studying) in Iran.

- Monitor and collect information on dissident elements abroad with the aim to suppress
- Monitor and collect on Israeli interests and targets.
- Monitor and collect on American presence, interests and targets.
- Assist in the procurement of technology and military hardware.
- Collect information in modern science and technology.
- Collect information on foreign countries.
- Collect information on foreign intelligence services through cooperation with friendly services.
- Collect information on drug trafficking.
- Collect information to support international terrorist operations through liaison with these groups and Islamic fundamentalist movements.

#### PRIORITIES AND TARGETS 9.

#### 9.1 MOIS priorities include:

- Iranian opposition groups (primarily the Mujahedin e Khalq Organisation (MKO). This includes kidnappings and assassinations ("liquidations") abroad - even in Europe.
- Iraqi oppositionists.
- Shia clerics.
- Israel as strategic and ideological threat, mainly due to the economic cooperation that existed between Israel and the Shah in the 1970s
- Jewish institutions and interests, including Israeli officials
- Support for Palestinian activities
- Support for and cooperation with the Hamas, Hizbollah (in Lebanon) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

#### INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MOIS AND THE SA INTELLIGENCE 10 COMMUNITY

### 10.1 Intelligence cooperation

In the area of intelligence exchange, the undertaking is to cooperate on the following:

- Organized crime including narcotics, people smuggling, arms trafficking, violent crimes such as robberies, money laundering and contravention of exchange control regulations.
- Control of the Private Security firms and related issues such as mercenary activities and support to conflict areas.
- Cooperation in countering international terrorism.

- Corruption, trans-national trends and practices in the respective countries, specific cases of mutual interest.
- Issues of concern and best practices in the area of immigration and border security issues
- Trends and effective management of issues arising from external conflicts.
- Security of economic initiatives and projects of mutual interest.
- Areas of Research and Development and Information Communication Technology.
- The sharing of information on stability with regard to global energy resources, with special reference to the oil resources of the Middle East (risks, threats and opportunities) (IM22: 2004/07/21)
- 10.1.1 On 07/07/2004 the Liaison officer of CI13 reported that the SASS DG was to lead a delegation to Iran. The MOIS representative wanted to know the names and the seniority of the delegation from the SASS representative who was present at the liaison meeting.
- 10.2 Priorities regarding South Africa
- 10.2.1 Iran regards South Africa as a partner in international forums where Iran needs to brake out of its political isolation. In its Dialogue Against Nations initiative, Iran has engaged a number of South African academics to assist them in promoting the reformist views of the Iranian President. Although the available information on the Iranian intelligence requirements in South Africa is dated, it is suspected that some/most of the known broad intelligence requirements remained unchanged, namely:
  - Political issues like the RSA's policy towards Iran.
  - The influence of radical Islam in South Africa.
  - Activities of Western countries in South Africa.
  - The South African media, including the print media, radio and television as well as the names of members of publishing houses, news editors, and journalists who report on the Middle East. (DIR: CI20: 03/03/2003)
  - The CI structures of NIA (DIR: CI20: 03/03/2003)
  - Nuclear technology.
  - South African mining industry.
  - Armament industry.
    - Procedures to upgrade the C130 aeroplane. Iran has 85 C130 aeroplanes in service.
    - Helicopter blade upgrade from metal to composite. The technology to manufacture helicopter blades from composites is a leading edge technology. This technology is one of the unique features of the Rooivalk helicopter.
    - The manufacturing of turbine blades. This technology to manufacture turbine blades is a leading edge technology.
    - Kentron's abilities in the design, development, testing and evaluation of missile systems.
    - > The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor.
- 10.2.2 The following interests were reported by the NCC on16/05/2005 for a scheduled visit to the NCC from 21-24 May 2005:
  - Satellite interception
  - Thuraya interception
  - Microwave link interception

- Reconnaissance UAV
- Radio Monitoring and radio location system in UN/UHF ranges
- Signal analysis and Data decoding
- Passive GSM monitoring
- Deciphering (secure mails, A5.2 \* Algorithm)
- Tactical jamming
- Training

Other issues raised by the Deputy Minister are:

- RSA advice on how to deal with uranium enrichment programme
- Electronic warfare: Does SA have a defensive capability?
- Area of forensic science

The following companies were visited:

- → Grintek Ewation
- → Vastek


At Grintek the following information was conveyed to the Iranian delegation:

- \* Electronic warfare systems and products for the global defence market (excluding self-protection Electronic Warfare). The focus was information warfare and information management in terms of ground based, shipborne and airborne SIGINT systems.
- \* Security systems for the professional and corporate markets.
- \* Turnkey logistic support solutions
- \* Spectrum monitoring

At Vastek the following information was conveyed to the delegation:

- \* Value Added Services Technologies that design and manufacture network based recording solutions for the worlds' recording markets for government and commercial applications in terms of:
  - Active Lawful Interception
  - Passive Unrestricted Monitoring

10.2.3 The Iranian company, Qods Aviation Industries Co, visited SA from 01 – 06 June 2005. The Iranian delegation consisted of the following individuals:



They visited Advanced Technical Engineering (ATE) who is involved in the development/production of the VULTURE Tactical UAV System for delivery to the South African Army Artillery. Qods Aviation Industries Co, approached ATE (South Africa) to explore opportunities of collaboration on the commercial application of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The meeting was a continuation of an initial meeting, which took place on 08 December 2004 with Iran, based upon an invitation by the South African Minister of Defence, encouraging the industries of both countries to seek common ground.

ATE gave a presentation on the VULTURE Tactical UAV System and also held a viewing session on the hardware.

The Iranian delegation provided a brochure on their range of UAV technology which include:

- \* A UAV Surveillance System designed for reconnaissance and surveillance.
- \* A Aerial Target System designed for surface—to—air armament training systems.
- \* A remote control training model aircraft.
- \* An UAV designed for target training of anti-aircraft gunnery systems.

It was agreed that the parties would explore collaboration in the field of UAVs that will include *inter alia* the following areas:

- \* Automatic Recovery
- \* Engineering Support
- \* Target Drones
- Upgrading of existing UAVs
- \* Radar Seekers
- Remotely Piloted Helicopters (RPH)
- \* Flight Navigation Systems
- \* Payloads (Day/Night Optical Sensors)
- Training.

The CEO of ATE, Mr DE BEER, stated that Qods Aviation Industries Co indicated to him that they have already visited Denel and that they intended to depart on 2005-06-06.

Remark: Since Iran is internationally regarded as a country of proliferation concern, cooperation between Iranian entities and the South African defence industry should be carefully considered, especially in view of the risk of international sanctions against the industry when it becomes known that they are negotiating contracts on non-proliferation and arms controlled technologies with such a country.

- 10.2.4 In October 2005 it was reported by a covert source that an Iranian delegation headed by Mr ROWHANI together with a member of the Iranian Embassy (Attaché: Science and Technology) met with President MBEKI. The nature of the discussions was a request from the Iranian Government to the SA Government to assist Iran with their nuclear program and to provide technical advice and technology. The Iranians do want to procure nuclear technology from South Africa but the details are not known. In September 2005 the Iranian Ambassador Mr GHANEZADEH and Attaché POURNAJAF, visited President MBEKI again on this issue.
- 10.2.5 On 07 November 2005 it was reported by the SA media that Iran was talking to South Africa about assistance with its nuclear programme in a bid to solve a prolonged international dispute over its atomic ambitions. "We are in the process of negotiating on the modalities of this participation," Javad VAIDI, an official from Iran's Supreme National Security Council, told state television. He said that South Africa had suggested supplying Iran with uranium oxide concentrate that the Islamic republic would then convert into uranium hexafluoride gas at its plant in the central city of Isfahan. [SAPA, dd. 7 November 2005].
- 10.3 Possible Targets in South Africa

- 10.3.1 Deducting from the existing cooperation agreements, stated intelligence needs, personal profile information and the visits brought to SA arms industry companies, there could be a possibility that the MOIS could have access to:
  - > DENEL
  - > ATE
  - > GRINTEK
  - VASTEK
  - National Communication Centre (NCC)
  - > SASS
  - > NIA
  - > The South African media
  - Department of Minerals and Energy
  - Department of Science and Technology
  - Department of Foreign Affairs
  - Department of Home Affairs
  - The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
  - > The pharmaceutical sector
  - > The chemical industry
  - NEPAD structures
- 10.3.2 According to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners, Iranian procurement activities indicate the establishment of small trading (import/export) companies in Europe headed by a director of Iranian origin. These small European companies are then utilised to disguise the actual end-user of non-proliferation controlled goods. They furthermore act as intermediaries between suppliers in Europe and end-users in Iran, possible also for the procurement of dual-use and/or non-proliferation controlled technologies.

  Comment: The advanced level of SA's technologies in the aerospace industry, especially in the missile guidance field has increasingly become a focal point. Iran is lacking experience in this field and it is foreseen that these industries will be targeted for procurement purposes.
- 10.3.3 Information further indicates that Iran's ballistic missile development and production programs fall under the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). The AIO utilises the following covering names to obtain relevant materials and equipment:
  - AIO, Commercial & Export Promotion Deputy.
  - Helal Co.
  - Sanam Industrial Co.
  - Sazmane Sanaye Hava & Faza (SSHF)
  - Shian Co. (CI30 DIR: 06/11/2002)

### 11. ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

During the 7<sup>th</sup> Iran-South Africa Joint Bilateral Commission, that took place from 21-22 July 2003, progress was reviewed in the mutual relations. Two working groups facilitated this process namely, the Political and Social Working Group and the Economic and Technical Working Group. According to a Memorandum of Understanding between SA and Iran that was to be signed in July 2003, the SA national oil company PetroSA and the Iranian National Oil Company were to work together on a "gas-to-liquid" project. Iran and South Africa were working together on joint feasibility studies in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors. The Understanding further covers trade, science, cultural, political and social sectors. (Business Day – 16/07/2003)

11.2	An suspect intelligence	e member,	stationed in Cape		
	Town at a cover structure	has been identified during 199	8. In addition, several suspected		
	Iranian intelligence members or agents have been identified. They include				
			a suspected		
	intelligence cover structure	e in Cape Town,	a businessman in		
	Pretoria and	vho, according to	information was appointed by the		
	Supreme Religious Leader	in Iran to stay in South Africa.			

11.3 According to sensitive information obtained by CI20, cover structures of the MOIS in SA are receiving funds from Iran via the Iranian Embassy in Pretoria. Suspected MOIS members under non-official cover structures in South Africa, are involved in handling and channelling the mentioned funds. The specific utilisation of these unspecified funds is as yet unknown. (DIR: CI20: 24/03/2003).

Remark: The mentioned suspected MOIS members are probably

11.4

See Profile.

According to the MOSSAD (09/2002 and 11/2002), a MOIS operative is by the name of is stationed in the RSA. His is allegedly involved in the oil refinery business and the carpet trade. No further information is available. He could however thus far not be traced or identified.

In a NIA Liaison Report dated May 2004 it was stated that the former LS 885 representative requested the SASS DDG, Mr SOKUPA to arrange a meeting with the NCC to discuss matters of cooperation.

Comment: It is strange that seeked SASS to facilitate a meeting with the NCC as it is a domestic instance. SASS organised a visit by an Iranian technical delegation to DENEL and GRINTEK in 2003 without the knowledge of NIA. It seems as when they could not succeed in convincing NIA in organising a meeting with a domestic company, they try SASS to organise such a meeting (with proven success).

Concerns were brought to the attention of the Head FIS Liaison: CI13 as the NCC produces a very specialized and tailor-made product for the South African Intelligence Community.

### 11.5 Suspects

An undeclared intelligence member, a cover structure has been identified during 1998. In addition, several suspected Iranian intelligence members or agents have been identified. They include a suspected intelligence cover structure in Cabe Town, a pusinessman in Pretoria and who, according to information was appointed by the Supreme Religious Leader in train to stay in South Africa.

See Prome in annexure.

Former DFA Chief Director: Middle Fast, Mr SALOOJEE, raised concern that a person by the name of visited the Department of Foreign Affairs on an occasion. He was the former driver of a former South African Ambassador, Mr Zola MABUDE in Iran. SALOOJEE met him in Iran when he (SALOJEE) visited the SA Mission in Iran. Currently is working in South Africa in the pharmaceutical industry

(HIV tests) with a business visa. When meeting Mr SALOOJEE, he was however more interested in the situation in South Africa. also indicated that he has 700 000 US Dollar to invest into his business. Remark: It seems strange that a former Embassy VIP-driver could have 700 000 US Dollar to his avail to invest. Mr MABUDE was later recalled and is now the SA High Commissioner in Swaziland. Mr SALOOJEE was recently appointed as SA Ambassador in Iran and has left for Iran at the end of April 2004. The information received for October 2004 states that a NIA member, who was at that stage the SASS HoS in Iran, still has contact with this here in SA. informed the NIA contact that he is staying in Sandton Johannesburg and that he brought his family to South Africa. He has a business in the pharmaceutical sector and wants to sell his products to SA government officials. Operation Akira was registered on him at the end of December 2004. The termination of the project was approved in October 2005 (a final status report was compiled and approved on 2005/10/18) as no espionage related information could be obtained to sustain any further suspicion and/or investigation. At the time of Mr Zola MABUDE's return to South Africa, and oth resigned from their posts at the SA Embassy in Iran. The The reason of the resignation of both was unclear. Instead of providing any reasons, just stated that Friends of former MOIS rep) and Iwo friends of the declared MOIS representative in South Africa are doing an English language course in Johannesburg. Information obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is different to the information obtained from the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) Immigration at the Johannesburg International Airport from travel records. According is the surname and is the first name. He applied for to DFA information a work permit in South Africa. At Immigration at the Johannesburg International Airport it is did not provide the name of indicated that he is on holiday in SA. The fact that school, which the two Iranian are currently attending, is suspicious. A white female was also seen dropping two men off at the Iranian Embassy on two different occasions. According to SASS, during September 2004 (date not given) SASS operational members identified a white female dropping two men at the Iranian Embassy on two different occasions. According to the SASS operational members, the white female vith two different personalised registration numbers. was driving a The following are the details of the car registration, which was used by the person as obtained from obtained from the Traffic Department: According to the Traffic Department the registration does not exist on the NATIS computer system and is most probably false. This registration number exists on the NATIS computer system and the identity of a female person was obtained and the particulars are as follows: Surname First name

SECRET

20

UNISA on 04 June 2005.

The main speakers of the mentioned event were:

Professor Yasien MOHAMMED

- University of Cape Town
- Professor Yusuf DADOO
- UNISA

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Shaheed MATHEE F SEEDAT (X4) Moulana Aftab HAIDER

Moulana Seyed Adbadallah HOSEINI

Zakiyah Fareed

- University of Cape Town

Magistrate in Durban

Ahl-ul Bait Foundation of SA
 Director Islamic centre JHB

- Researcher of Media Review Network (MRN)

Ghorbanali POURMAJAN VARJOVI the Cultural Attaché at the Iranian Embassy, was involved in the planning and coordination of the symposium. REMARK: According to CI20

### **IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLES AT IRANIAN SYMPOSIUM ON 04 JUNE 2005**

- 2000 Chrysler Jeep Cherokee Sport (Green)
  Owner:
- 2001 Renault Clio 1.4 RXE (White)
  Owner: Jean-Marie LEBON [Attache (Press) French Embassy]
- 2002 Kia Spectra 1.6 Exec M/T (Purplish Blue)

  Owner: Unknown (Was previously allocated to Mohammad Reza

  ZARE who was replaced by Mohammad ZAMANI Admin Officer at
  the Iranian Embassy on 13/09/2004)
- 1998 Toyota Camry 220 SEI (Verdite)
  Owner: Unknown, Vehicle belongs to the Iranian Embassy
- Unknown
  Owner: Unknown. Vehicle does not appear on the DFA Vehicle
  Database.
  - 1994 Toyota Camry (Gold)
    Owner: Unknown (Was previously allocated to Mohammad Hossein
    Zeraatgar GOHARDANI who was replaced by Ali Reza YAZDI Attaché at the Iranian Embassy on 06/11/2004).
- 1996 Toyota Corolla AE 110 (Green)

  Owner: Akbar Khosravi NEZHAD (Attaché Scientific and Cultural at the Iranian Embassy)
  - 2002 Volvo S40 (Silver
    Owner: Touraj JALALI (former Counsellor at the Iranian Embassy)
- 1998 Toyota Camry 200SI (White)

  Owner: Mohammad Hossein LATIFI (3<sup>rd</sup> Counsellor at the Iranian Embassy)
- 2003 Mazda Etude (Silver)

  Owner: Unknown. Vehicle belongs to the Iranian Embassy

Comment: It is suspicious that vehicles are still used that was registered to diplomatic personnel who were replaced in 2004. Especially noteworthy is that a vehicle was used that was allocated

### 12. MODUS OPERANDI

Information obtained gives insight into the Iranian espionage threat against South Africa. It proofs that these espionage activities are much broader than only espionage. Links between Iranian intelligence members and local extremist organisations and possible terrorist cells/groups were confirmed.

### 12.1 Cover as Foreign Affairs official

Assessing the modus operandi of Iranian intelligence officials it is observed that internationally the modus operandi of the Iranian intelligence community is to place MOIS personnel in Iranian embassies and consulates in senior diplomatic positions or as representatives of the Ministry of Guidance and Propaganda. MOIS officers appointed in diplomatic positions make use of different posts in an embassy or consulate, responsible for a variety of different functions. These posts include:

- Counsellor posts
- Cultural posts
- Educational posts
- Economic posts
- Press affairs (Communication).

The post of Political or Economic Attaché is utilised, depending on the region where the intelligence member is posted. The posts of Cultural Attaché and Ambassador, which are traditional cover slots of the Iranian intelligence community, have been utilised in South Africa.

The establishment of cultural ties with the host country opens the way for the establishment of Cultural Centres in the host country. MOIS members are then placed as Cultural Attachés in Embassies. Diplomatic cover gives the undeclared member freedom of movement to liaise extensively with organisations and cultural centres in the Muslim community of the host country.

Intelligence stations abroad operate independently from the Iranian Foreign Ministry. The MOIS members placed at these stations are not accountable to the Ambassador, but report directly to the MOIS in Iran. (01/08/2001).

A MOIS member being placed abroad under the cover of a Foreign Affairs official has the responsibility to make contact with an already established Hizbollah or Hamas cell in a target country, or to recruit members for a cell. This cell then receives training after which the targeting of an identified target, usually an American or Israeli target, starts. The subsequent act of sabotage / terrorism / assassination is carried out by members of the cell, giving the MOIS member deniability. The MOIS member selected for these type of task, usually has experience in handling Hizbollah or Hamas groups.

### 12.2 Non-official and deep cover

Non-official covers include Iran Air (the official airline of Iran), the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). Collaborators in these organisations are regularly used for intelligence activities. Shipping companies are used for the transport of arms, however without the direct involvement of intelligence officers. Collaborators are utilized instead.

The cover of students, merchants, shopkeepers and bank clerks is also used for traveling overseas while making use of false names and false passports. The MOIS has frequently relied on the foreign branches of Iranian state-controlled banks to place intelligence agents abroad and to finance terrorist operations.

In South Africa, available information on certain Iranian individuals and some companies indicates that the MOIS utilises influential Iranian individuals, Muslim centres and businesses, to establish or expand a radical Islamic base within the broad community. Muslim organisations are utilised for logistical purposes (eg the arrangement of money, visas and safe houses). Collaborators and agents (local persons, mainly Muslims) are utilised to assist the intelligence operator in preparing attacks and providing logistical support. Once a volunteer has successfully been tested, he becomes a collaborator.

Links between suspected Iranian intelligence members and influential Iranian representatives in the Iranian émigré community have been determined. Especially individuals in religious cultural affairs and the Persian carpet trade are used as deep cover for intelligence activities. Visiting delegations are often exploited for intelligence purposes by including intelligence members who utilise these visits for contacting these individuals.

Muslim centres are also utilised for talent spotting and recruitment for religious training in Iran. Non-official representatives form part of this process. Training in Iran provides MOIS with the opportunity to do some talent-spotting to identify more militant students for further training in inter alia assassinations, sabotage and terrorism. These students are, on completion of their studies, sent back to their countries of origin where they are utilised for intelligence purposes.

According to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners, Iranian procurement activities of sensitive proliferation materials relating to WMD, indicate the establishment of small trading (import/export) companies in Europe headed by a director of Iranian origin. These small European companies are then utilised to disguise the actual end-user of nonproliferation controlled goods. They furthermore act as intermediaries between suppliers in Europe and end-users in Iran, possible also for the procurement of dual-use and/or nonproliferation controlled technologies.

Comment: The advanced level of SA's technologies in the aerospace industry, especially in the missile guidance field has increasingly become a focal point. Iran is lacking experience in this field and it is foreseen that these industries will be targeted for procurement purposes.

12.3 Double agent operations

The MOIS makes regular use of double agents because this is seen as the first step of penetrating a foreign intelligence service. Iranian diplomats are encouraged to respond to foreign diplomats' proposals for cooperation. Such a relationship is then usually continued under MOIS control. All contacts with foreign diplomats must be reported.

Utilisation of the Diplomatic Bag 12.4

Both the Ministeries of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Committees make use of the diplomatic bag to send arms to the Iranian Embassies abroad. These arms are then stored in the Embassy with the full knowledge of the Ambassador.

Meeting Places

The Embassy

The undeclared intelligence member in an Embassy mostly operates from within the Embassy and will preferably meet contacts inside the Embassy. Friendly, safe environments like Mosques or specially prepared safe houses are also used. A principle agent or a cut-out are sometimes used to meet an agent on his behalf.

Public places

However, public places like restaurants and parks were also utilised in the past. Sometimes meetings take place while walking through a public park or driving in a safe car as part of counter measures.

Third country

A third country is sometimes used to meet an agent. When the MOIS is unable to open an office in a country, it will try to run agents directly from Iran using a third country for agent-handling. Third country handling of agents forms part of the modus operandi utilised by Iranian intelligence members internationally. These third countries will be countries that Iranians can easily travel to.

Target country visits

An alternative option is to send intelligence officers to a country where MOIS agents operate for a meeting. They will then visit the country on an official visit for a short period, conduct the necessary briefing and debriefing or recruitment and then return to Iran.

#### Iran

Agents are sometimes send back to Iran for briefing and debriefing. This is usually done to reinforce an agent's motivation and morale.

#### 12.6 Assassinations

The MOIS is not afraid to carry out assassinations of dissidents abroad as it is seen as part of its responsibility to promote the Iranian Revolution. From 1989 to 2002 the MOIS was directly responsible for 24 assassinations in Europe and Turkey. These assassinations were carried out with the approval of the President and the Supreme Leader, who is in charge of the promotion of the Islamic Revolution. According to an assessment by the BSIS in October 2002, it is unlikely that Iran will attempt assassinations of its dissident groups outside Iran or Iraq at this stage.

MOIS members placed abroad play a key role in the collection of information on potential targets for assassination. Although most assassinations were in the past carried out by MOIS officers or Iranian citizens trained by the MOIS, the latter also makes use of third parties to carry out these assassinations. The arrest of Lebanese following the killing of Kurds in Berlin, Germany in September 1992 and the recruitment of Algerian immigrants by the MOIS in Europe, clearly indicates the modus operandi of the MOIS to ensure greater deniability.

### 12.7 Profile of intelligence member

12.7.1 The Iranian intelligence member is highly motivated and difficult to recruit. He is usually a courteous (polite), tolerant (understanding) and persuasive (believable, convincing) person with the necessary skills to handle or deal with agents. He applies counter-surveillance measures throughout/constantly.

### 13. FRONT STRUCTURES

13.1 Iranian foundations such as the Mustadafin & Janbazan Foundations are instrumental in exporting the Iranian revolution. The latter has powerful religious allies and large budgets. The Foundation Head usually travel on a diplomatic passport and forms a close link to the cultural centres in a host country. In South Africa the following organisations have been identified as suspect front structures of the MOIS:

## 13.1.1 THE AHL-UL BAIT FOUNDATION OF SOUTH AFRICA (AFOSA) ("FAMILY OF THE PROPHET")

It forms part of the Tehran-based Ahl-al-Bait. It is especially active in looking after the well-being of the Shia Muslim community in the Cape Peninsula.

Address : 2 De Wet Road, Ottery

Postal address : PO Box 729, Cape Town, 8000

Tel : (021) 704 1580

Fax

Bank account Business (021) 704 1581

To serve as spritul home for Shia Muslims in the RSA

Personnel Note

A company by the name of Gester G Pre-Paid Migration is registered

with the same address as that of AFOSA.

Background

The Ahl-ul Bait Foundation of South Africa (AFOSA) is part of an international Teheran-based organisation, called Ahl-ul Bait ("Family of the Prophet"), which was established in 1990. The Ahl-ul Bait falls under the authority of Hojjat ul-Islam ali TASHKIRI, who is the Head of the Iranian Organisation of Culture and Islamic Relations (OCIR). TASHKIRI was a conservative Iranian cleric who reported directly to the Ayatollah KHAMENEI (Supreme spiritual leader of Iran and the Shia Muslims).

Although the Ahl-ul Bait Foundation describes itself as an academic research body for the studying of Shia Islam, the Ahl-ul Bait Foundation is internationally involved in:

- Promoting Shi'ism and increasing Shia influence in traditional Sunni communities.
- The dissemination of Iranian propaganda.
- Promoting the concept of the Iranain revolution.

The Ahl-ul Bait is especially active amongst poorer communities and will usually establish cultural centres or Muslim schools and will liaise with the Iranian Cutural Attaché, if the country has diplomatic ties with Iran. The Ahl-ul Bait also works in union with the MOIS to collect information, do talent-spotting and to radicalise Muslim communities. In Africa the Ahl-ul Bait has established itself in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.

and established the AFOSA with Iranian money with the aim to convert South Africans, especially the African population, to the Shi doctrine of Islam, as opposed to the orthodox Sunni doctrine. He started with religious classes at the Al-Jamia Usmania Mosque in Bonteheuwel. Until now and the Ahlul-Bait Foundation have been active in promoting Shiism in the Western Cape through inter alia the distribution of Iranian propaganda material.

AFOSA has classes each evening till 22:30 during which the Quran is studied and prayers being said. It is leads these classes and are usually attended by 100-120 people. It is rumoured that he is the spiritual leader to local activists. According to unconfirmed information students are recruited at Ahl-ul Bait for training in militant Islam in Iran and Afghanistan.

(REMARK: has apparently received military training in Pakistan/Afghanistan and the Telegani Centre (Iran) and fought in the Iran/Iraq war during the 1980s). MOIS targets both Shiite and Sunni communities in foreign countries and uses foundations, eg Ahl-ul Bait to promote Iranian influence. It is therefore a suspected Iranian intelligence cover structure).

### 13.1.2 SILK ROAD INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS AND DISTRIBUTORS

It is a publishing and distribution house for Middle Eastern literature.

Registration no: 91/14198/23

Address : 143 Long Market Street, Cape Town, 8000.

Postal address : PO Box 2281, Cape Town, 8000

Tel : (021) 424 3650 Fax : (021) 424 5842

Business : Retailer of Islamic literature and Persian carpets, including the import of

these items

Personnel

Background

Silk Road was established in Cape Town in June 1991 who had the majority stake in the company. Silk Road is part of a global Islamic movement that seeks to implement Islam as an ideology alternative to Western ideology. It has branches in the UK (London), Benin, The Netherlands, Dubai, Lebanon (Beirut) and also in other countries with extensive Muslim communities.

s an Iranian who was tasked by the Iranian Ministry of Culture to set up the office in Cape Town for the dessemination of pro-Iranian literature and to provide assistance to pro-Iranian groups in the RSA. In January 1993 returned to Iran and was replaced by another Iranian national, as Director of Silk Road.

Silk Road has the motto of "Read globally, act locally" and has the broad aim to see the growth of Islam knowledge in local communities through the following:

- The establishment of links between Muslims in South Africa. This involves links with the Iranian diplomatic representatives. had close links to the Iranian Embassy (Iranian Interest Section in Johannesburg) and had also contact with the Islamic Centre for Africa in Durban, the World Assembly of the Ahl-ul Bait in Rylands in the Cape, and The Islamic College of South Africa (ICOSA), which frequently uses material of Silk Road for research purposes.
- The import and distribution of Islamic literature. Silk Road offers a small but qualitative range of reading material. It sells directly to the public as well as to booksellers and opens accounts for customers with very easy repayment terms. Its Islamic literature is in English, Farsi or Arabic while stocks of tape cassets and videos (Quaranic recitals, music, films), picture postcards, posters, art prints, art books and authentic hand-woven Persian carperts and kilms are available.
- The commemoration of local and global Islamic occations, events and personalities. Silk Road works with local Muslim organisations in hosting activities on religious Islamic events, eg
  - \* 24 November that commemorates the birthday of H Fatima, the prophet's daughter and the exemplar to Muslim woman.
  - \* International Qaris (those fluent in the recital of the Quaran).
  - \* Islamic Expos
- The promotion of media activities. Silk Road is the local distributor of international Islamic newspapers like Crescent International, Al-Alam, Teheran Times, and Kayhan International. Other literature includes journals like Noor Al-Islam, Echo of Islam, At-Tauhid, Mahjuba (for woman), etc.

- The promotion of local publishing. Whenever Muslim writing is offered to Western publishers, it is not published. Silk Road invites manuscripts on Islamic and African issues and publishes, distribute and sell it to local and international outlets. Silk Road also acts as editor giving advice and recommendations for improvement. It has published 5 books of Achmad CASSIEM (Qibla leader and IUC Chairperson):
  - \* Igraa: Freedom from Ignorance (1992);

\* Ramadan: Month of high intensity Training (1992);

- \* The intellectual roots of the oppressed and Islam's triumph over Apartheid (1992):
- \* Quest for Unity (1992);

The Begging Bowl (1993).

Remark: CASSIEM's books sold well because Muslims welcome his ideology and that he was seen as Allah's blessing to Muslims in South Africa.

Silk Road also regularly published a newsletter, Al-Hujjat, in which extremist viewpoints were expressed that popularised the notion of an Islamic revolution, based on the Iranian example. This newsletter was published monthly on behalf of AFOSA.

Silk Road employed 2 salaried staff in November 2000 and owned one vehicle. In August arrived from Teheran to replace as and shareholder in the company, with the only other shareholder being a certain

Though continuous investigations the following have been confirmed:

- A company with the same name as Silk Roads and also run by Iranians was uncocered as a front for the MOIS in Canada during the late 1980s.
- relations (OCIR). Comment: The OCIR resorts under the Iranian Ministry of Culture and its primary tsak is to direct and control the dissemination of pro-Iranian and Shia propaganda in foreign countries including the building of Mosques, Cultural Centres, Schools, etc.
  - There was direct contact between
    - ere was direct contact between
    - \* M H BORIJAN-YAZDI (former Iranian Cultural Attaché in the RSA)
    - \* Ismail COLLIER (senior Qibla and IUC member)
    - \* MAHDAVI (former Iranian Ambassador to the RSA)

### 13.1.3 PERSIAN WORLD

Registration no: 95/50912/23

Address : Three branches: 8 High Street, Bellville / 101st George Street, Cape Town, / Shop 36, Kenilworth Centre, 90 Chichester Road, Claremont.

Postal address: PO Box 1873, Cape Town, 8000

Tel : (021) 914 0777

(021) 424 1414 (021) 674 9997

Business : The import and retail of Persian carpets and handicraft

Personnel :

	he mother company, Persian World, is situated in Teheran. With whom had contact (11/2000). World in South Africa in November 1995  Namibia, Botswana and Gauteng on several occasions. He had plans to pen carpet shops, similar to Persian World in these areas. Persian World is as far as ould be established, a legitimate business. The suspect activities of however tracted intelligence attention. He had been abroad for extensive periods.
	AGAD and former I with contact telethone numbers on 01/11/2000 that was taking over was not the owner of Persian World for some time).
1.4	Registration no : 93/15545/23 Address : The Homestead, Kommetjie Road, Sunnydale, Fish Hoek Postal address : PO Box 22006, Fish Hoek, 7975 Tel : (021) 930 8233 Business : The import and export of Persian carpets. Imports are said to be from Iran and the UK, while exports are done to Zimbabwe and North Africa.  Personnel :
	Shortly after assuming the post of proceeded to registered Pars in June 1993. Originally Pars functioned from the same offices as Silk Road, but was later relocated to Fish Hoek. Currently the shareholders in Pars are and a certain the person managing Pars was reported to be another Iranian national by the name of According to unconfirmed information:
	Pars channels Iranian funds to Qibla (including the Mustadafin Foundation) and Pagad.  have direct contact with:

### 13.1.5 MEANA - MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA NEWS AGENCY

Registration no: 95/17994/23

Address : Old Mutual Building, Durban Road, Bellville
Postal address : PO Box 2376, Bellville, 7535
Tel : (021) 215 901

Fax

: (021) 215 902

Business Personnel News Agency

established the MEANA in Cape Town in May 1995 to provide objective coverage or Muslim affairs internationally. Both (currently involved with Radio 786) are involved with the MEANA, with being a

#### 13.1.6 IRNA - Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency

#### 13.1.7 IRIB - Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Company

- 13.1.8 Information further indicates that Iran's ballistic missile development and production programs fall under the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). The AIO utilises the following covering names to obtain relevant materials and equipment:
  - AIO, Commercial & Export Promotion Deputy.
  - Helal Co.
  - Sanam Industrial Co.
  - Sazmane Sanaye Hava & Faza (SSHF)
  - Shian Co. (Cl30 DIR: 06/11/2002)

#### 13.1.9 IRANIAN GUESTHOUSE

71 Tyrwitt Rosebank Johannesburg

#### 14. TRAINING

- 14.1. In August 1995 five MOIS members received training in the latest spy techniques under the auspices of the Russian Interior Ministry. It entailed modern techniques of espionage and counter espionage, investigation and psychological warfare.
- 14.2 According to unconfirmed information received in 11/2002 some Muslim Communities under the guise of Self-Defence Units receive paramilitary training in order to keep them ready to assist Muslims all over the world with their fight against the West.
- 14.3 The Zakariya Park Madressa in Zakariya Park in Johannesburg, has regular training sessions for South African Muslim students and foreigners in order to keep them ready for a possible Jihad against USA aggression in the Middle East.
- In Port Elizabeth so a facilitating training on a farm near Port Elizabeth. It is known that a lot of Pakistani citizens are attending these training sessions. The exact location of the farm is not known.

  REMARK:

  was in the past detained by the Sri Lanka government for alleged extremist activities. was responsible for establishing and funding Madressas in Sri Lanka. He was later released on a lack of evidence against him. He is currently in Port Elizabeth in the Malaba area.
- In Kwazulu Natal stems from the Darool Vloom Madressa in Newcastle but was born in Cape Town. He is known to have links with the Taliban of Afghanistan and is a known

Mujahedin fighter. is known for extremist views and is not scared to make militant statements.

#### 15. CONCLUSION

- 15.1 A comprehensive threat assessment indicating the espionage threat posed by Iran can only be compiled once all available information (albeit dated in some instances) is assessed. The extent of Iranian intelligence involvement in South Africa, referring to the access and activities of suspect Iranian intelligence members and loyal supporters of the MOIS, via the official and non-official cover Iranian nationals and Iranian diplomats allegedly have, needs to be established.
- 15.2 Alleged links between identified Iranian nationals and extremist groups active in destabilising the Western Cape is an issue of concern. Indications that alleged front companies of the Iranian intelligence community are involved in pro-Iranian propaganda which is supportive of these extremist groupings (involved in anti-constitutional activities) and serves to morally support them, is another issue of concern that should be confirmed as a matter of urgency.

It is foreseen that close cooperation between this Desk, analysts at Chief Directorate IM22 and specific provincial offices will have to be established to ensure that all relevant Iranian intelligence links are investigated and assessed.



### SUBJECT: The UAE's Seizure of Arms delivered from North Korea to Iran

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

IT MAY NOT BE SHARED WITH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT (OR A THIRD PARTY)

WITHOUT A PRIOR CONSENT OF THE ORIGINATOR

- ☐ The vessel titled 「Song Hoa 2」 loaded with ten containers departed from Nampo port on June first, 2009 for the Dalian port in China, and changed container B/L at the Dalian port. (The containers were not changed.)
- At the Dalian port, this containers were loaded onto the vessel named raining XIN YAN TIAN, owned by the Chinese company CSCL, and then departed for the Shanghai port for transshipment.
  - o At the Shanghai port, the containers were transshipped once agin to the vessel titled 「ANL AUSTRALIA」 owned by the Australian company ANL Container Line, and then departed for the final destination, Bandar Abbas port in Iran.
- The UAE authorities conducted a physical check of the 「ANL AUSTRALIA」 when the vessel called at Khor AL-Fakkan port in the UAE on her route to Iran, and discovered ten suspicious containers. So, the authorities unloaded the containers on July 22 and conducted a through check.

- o The check disclosed that the containers contained anti-tank rockets (RPG-7) and various types of ammunitions and parts, so the UAE authorities seized all of the items.
- ☐ The UAE authorities notified the UN Sanctions Committee of the result of the container check since North Korea's arms export to Iran is in breach of the UN resolution 1874. And the Committee sent a letter on August 25 to Iran and North Korea respectively requesting explanation of the illegal arms delivery.
- ☐ In response to the UNSC request, North Korea sent a letter to the President of the UNSC under the name of the North Korean Ambassador to UN, stating that it felt no need to answer to such request because it had never approved the UNSC resolution 1874 from the first place and threatening to reinforce its nuclear capacity and to further deteriorate the situation.
- o In the meantime, Iran denied its involvement saying it was a conspiracy of Zionists.
- ☐ The UAE's seizure of the containers heading to Iran with North Korea-produced arms is the first of its kind to have been disclosed and seized since the UNSC adopted the resolution 1874, and clearly demonstrates that North Korea continues to illegally export its arms in spite of the UNSC sanctions.

British

The following documents were exchanged.

-A letter of congratulations to Mr Lizo NJENJE, EM10, congratulating him for his appointment as the Head of NIA. A meeting to discuss the status of the relationship between the two services was proposed by SIS. A courtesy call was requested, seeing that Controller for Africa and Americas, would be in Pretoria on 11 – 12 November 2009. -Further information on ERFCO was provided. ERFCO visited Iran in 2008 and deals for up to \$1 million with LMI a front company for the make of missiles was done.

SECRET

200

20 October 2009

Mr Lizo Gibson Njenje Director General NIA British High Commission Pretoria

255 Hill Street Pretoria 0002

t: +27 12 421 7524 f: +27 12 421 7555 Website:

Dear Director General

On behalf of the British security and intelligence community, I would like to congratulate you on your appointment as Director General.

I am aware that you have previously been directly involved in the long-standing co-operation that exists between NIA and British intelligence. I very much hope that we will be able to build on these foundations and establish productive and effective co-operation. In particular, I am keen to ensure that you and your colleagues receive all necessary support to guarantee that the World Cup in 2010 is a great success and free of security threats.

As you may know, I have only recently arrived in South Africa and have not yet had the opportunity to meet many senior staff from NIA. I would very much welcome an early opportunity to meet with you, introduce myself and discuss how we can work together to improve our operational co-peration.

I would like to take this opportunity to inform you that I have asked.

SIS

Controller for Africa and Americas, to visit as soon as possible in order to meet you and the other members of the South African intelligence community, in order to discuss our relationship.

has proposed to come to Pretoria on Wednesday 11th and Thursday 12th November, and I very much hope we can arrange a suitable time for him to call on you.

Best wishes.



SECRET



#### SECRET UKSA EYES ONLY

Our Ref:

682

Date:

28 October 2009

#### FURTHER BACKGROUND ON ERFCO

- Further to our note 678 and our meeting on 10 September 2069, please find below further information on ERFCO and their Iranian business dealings.
- According to reliable reporting, LMI is a front company set up by the Iranian Shahid Sattari Ground Equipment Industries (SSGEI) organisation, which is responsible for the production of missile launchers and ground support equipment and is involved in the development of rocket bodies. SSGEI is subordinate to the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid-propelled ballistic missile programme and was designated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737.
- During a visit to Iran by a representative of the South African company Electric Resistance Furnaces SA (ERFCO) in June 2008, SSGEI went to great lengths to pretend that LMI is a genuine company and to hide the fact that it is related to the missile industry.
- According to reporting from a separate source, frantan entities associated with the Iranian Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) made payments to ERFCO totaling between \$00,000 and one million US dollars and/or Euros between late 2007 and early 2009. The DIO too was designated under UNSCR 1737.
- 5 We would be cruteful if you could ensure that if an approach is made to ERFCC the above information is not imported to them.
- 6. Grateful for a convenient date/time to meet to discuss the above further. Many thanks.

SECRET UKSA EYES ONLY

#### Iran: Information request

The purpose of this tasking is to give an assessment of Iran's current interests and activities in South Africa, and give guidance as to elaborate and gain on information collection efforts in order to determine the full extent of their activities. Reference is made throughout report to information received from CI20.

#### Doc dated 11 Jan 08:

The Iranian Department of Foreign Affairs conducted an internal conference/discussion in the course of the last six months of 2007. This conference addressed the issue of Iran's strategic geopolitical relations, and emanating from that as a matter of policy a process of aligning itself closer to China, began. China's quiescent backing of Iran in the course of its "argument" with the United States concerning its nuclear program, together with direct backing from the Russian Federation in terms of the concrete workings of its civilian nuclear program, may be two of a much more complex set of factors that has brought Iran to this point. Furthermore, Iran's Africa policy would also have given a boost as a component part of the strategic reorientation of Iran's foreign relations. Did this strategic geopolitical policy translated into their intelligence activities in SA and how did the MOIS go about it? Will this change after the re-election of the President AHMADINEJAD? How is their shifting towards China realising in SA as well as with the Russians?

#### Doc dated 11 Jan 08:

Iran has been of the opinion that President Jacob ZUMA has good relations with Muslims. It has been stated that a more popular South African president with a leftist political orientation (or, at least the backing of leftist forces in the ANC alliance) is much more acceptable than a Western oriented businessman who will in all likelihood follow blindly in the footsteps of the MBEKI administration when it comes to macro-economic policy.) What is their most recent opinion of the new SA Government?

#### Doc dated 13 March 08 I

indicated in this report that people in Iran, and some Iranian government officials are not very impressed by the leadership of Mr. AHMADINEJAD. He says that the president is much more popular outside Iran than he is inside. The internal opinion is very much defined in the following way:

- That Mr. AHMADINEJAD and his advisors have broken down all the bridges his predecessor, Mr. KHATTAMI with his discourse on the 'dialogue among civilisations', tried to build to the outside world
- The fact that Iran has not had any effective diplomatic relations with the USA since 1979 has had a negative impact because there are no formal channels through which political disputes or differences can be resolved
- That the current round of sanctions, inspections of shipments going into Iran, and related military strategies led by the USA in the Middle East are doing major damage to Iran's economy, and society

He is of the opinion that the current Iranian president is personally responsible for leading Iran into a very tight spot of international isolation. After President AHMADINEJAD's re-eletion as President – what is the current feeling? Will his re-election effect MOIS operations in SA and Africa (also seen in light of the sacking of Gholam Hossein Mohseni EJEI, the head of the MOIS on 12 June 2009 as well as the dismissal of Intelligence Minister Mohsen EZHEIE (27 June 2009) and subsequent appointment of Majid ALAVI as acting Intelligence Minister on 28 June 2009).

Doc dated 16 April 08: It is stated in this report that Iran is political positioning themselves within the South African foreign policy framework and that the Embassy in SA is following this initiative. It is implied that their deliberations on strategies to promote and boost the image of Iran will necessitate engagements with media, civil-society, governmental, and business networks in the country. It obviously makes South Africa an important target in Iran's current struggles in the world political system. Several questions about the structure and reach of the Independent Newspaper group were posed. If Iran is seeking to position itself in South Africa, the strategy may be complicated by this country's own political transition problems in the ruling party. This may to some extent explain their urgent need to develop deeper insight into the workings of the South African media, and avenues at the disposal of the embassy to extend its reach and consequently influence.)

What developments took place in relation to their influencing activities since the reporting

Doc dated 13 May 08: Interest has been shown to meet journalists from SABC radio, to access leading figures in the local community, e.g. to leaders of cultural organizations and to arrange for a dinner/s where the ambassador can interact with other influential people such as newspaper editors. Was this avenue operationally pursued?

#### Doc dated 3 June 08 |

In discussions on the issue of Xenophobia, many questions about the anti-US sentiments in South Africa and Southern Africa were asked. It is mentioned the fact that SADC leaders' rejection of the establishment of bases for Pentagon's African Command (AFRICOM) in SADC member states' territory, may be creating a situation where the US will engage in covert activities to destabalise countries opposed to its security paradigm in Africa. What kind of covert activities? Did the person elaborate on this?

11 June 2008: The company	OVE	does exist and the co directors of	are:

to be a NIA target but was removed from the Target list as no information on him was forthcoming. What is the nature of the relationship between is the links to MOIS? At the time there has been a request for investigation from the operational structures? Was this investigation done and if so, what transpired?

#### Doc dated 24 July 08

member of MOIS and one of the known modus operandi of the MOIS is to use IRNA as a cover for intelligence activities

also a suspected MOIS-member/Agent. Another partner is who used to be a senior official in the South African Department of the south Afr

# A new official at the embassy has been appointed at the Iran Embassy. The discussions centred on changes in the SA political landscape. Impute mentioned in the course of the conversation that he is a marketing expert. This was said in the context of a discussion we had on dynamics in Africa's mining sector. He expressed a lot of interest in this requested information on developments in mining, and related political dynamics. Like earlier in 2008, one of his first business-related questions in the African context dealt with Israeli activity and influence in Africa. What has happened since then? Seeing that all the Iranian Diplomats so far have requested pecifically regarding the Israeli activities in Africa was tasked to ask them specifically in what regarding the Israeli's they are interested in. What is latest on this?

is back in South Africa running his own private in order to develop business in order to develop business between Iran and South Africa. Concern is expressed in the report that may be a front company of the Iranian MOIS. What is current status of and what do we know of the activities of Why do we suspect to be a front for MOIS? Is anything being done operationally regarding the rumours regarding environmental scanning, etc?

#### 1 June 2009

The Iranian Embassy has undergone a clean-up and several diplomats whose loyalty towards President AHMADINEJAD where questioned, where sent home Names mentioned are as well as who is described as the head of the The person that is behind this "cleansing" is local Revolutionary Guard. has a gambling problem and is closely watched by also planned to political contacts, he could terminate his placement in South Africa but because of is not compromised by building up bad dept. now ensures that name was mentioned, are allegedly concentrating more on Some diplomats, their own interest than spending time on the Embassy/Iran's interests. The declared MOIShas been active liaising with his counterparts from African member, has been active liaising with his counterparts from Africa. The purpose is to promote Iran as Iran wants to expand their presence, trade etc in SADC as well as in the AU. Iran is actively trying to exert its influence in the previous USSR Muslim Countries, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan that forms together with the Russian Federation the countries of the Caspian rim. The purpose is to neutralise the Russian influence on these countries.

2009-06-09



#### K5F014A

1.	2A2F047.L4H	
2.	291045B	
3.	29 JUNE 2012	
4.	03 PAGE(S)	
5.	ROUTINE	

6.	CM EF21,
7.	SECRET
8.	B14: LIAISON CONTACT REPORT
9.	LIAISON PRODUCT
10.	EF21/2/ EL/LS/VI

11.	HoS EF21/2
12.	EF21/2
13.	PALESTINE: HOSEF21/2 LIAISON MEETING WITH LS829 ON 28

- 1. Above matter refers.
- 2. Please find contact report below.
- 3. Thank you.

APPROVED: HOS – EF21/2 /end

### STATE SECURITY AGENCY LIAISON CONTACT REPORT

To : COUNTRY MANAGER EF21

Reference : SSA/EF21/2/EL/LS/VI (LS 829)

Date : 29 JUNE 2012

Name of Liaison Service : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Country : UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Name of SASS member(s)

Name of LS member(s)

Date of meeting : 29 JUNE 2012

Place of meeting : EAST JERUSALEM

Type of meeting (Personal/Telephone): PERSONAL

Documents exchanged (yes/no) : NO

If yes - Specify document(s)

Other people/officials involved : NONE

Initiator of contact : CIA

#### **PURPOSE**

1. LS 829 Invitation Card to their National Day.

#### REPORT

- 2. Purpose of the meeting was to hand HOS EF21/2 invitation card to the US national day on 04 July 2012.
- 3. Leading as just returned from a two week tour of Masai Mara Game reserve in Kenya.
- 4. OBSERVATIONS
- 4.1 seem to be desperate to make inroads into Hamas in Gaza and possibly would like SSA to assist them in gaining access.
- 4.2 If SSA was to link with Hamas, SSA stand the chance of benefitting from that interaction in that we would establish the collection priorities and requirements of LS829.
- 5. REMARKS
- 5.1 EF21's advice on paragraph 4.2 is hereby requested.
- 4.3 Information report is contained in IIR number 212F046.L4H.

Thank you for your attention.

**END OF MESSAGE** 

PPROVED BY: HOS EF21/2

#### MESSAGE FORM 202E054.J2 1. 291315B 2. 29 May 2012 3. 01 OF 06 PAGES [INCL. ANNEXURE] 4. ROUTINE 5. CM: EF23 6. SECRET 7. **B14: CONTACT REPORT** 8. LIAISON REPORT EL/LS/VI 10. HOS: EF23/1 11. R22A 12. LIAISON REQUEST LS 826: NORTH AFRICA BRIEFING 13.

- The above subject refers; attached please find LS 826 Contact Report.
- With reference to paragraph 2.4 (previous request) it would be appreciated if Chief
  Directorate Y could be requested to provide briefing notes and a specific tasking in
  respect of North Africa that the SSA would want HoS to pursue with LS 826.
- 3. Thank you for your attention.

APPROVED BY HOS: EF23

END OF MESSAGE







### FOREIGN BRANCH LIAISON CONTACT REPORT

To : Divisional Head EF23

Reference : SSA/R22A/EL/LS/VI (LS 826)

Date : 28 May 2012

Name of Liaison Service : MOIS

Country : Iran

Name of SSA:

Foreign Branch member(s)

Name of LS member(s) : Head of Liaison Liaison Officer

Interpreter - Name unknown

Date of meeting : 28 May 2012

Place of meeting : MOIS Guesthouse in Pasdaran, Gulistan 5 no 207

Type of meeting : Personal


Documents exchanged (yes/no) : No

Other people/officials involved : None

Initiator of contact : Station EF23/1

#### 1. PURPOSE

1.1 The primary purpose for requesting the meeting was to obtain feedback from LS 826 regarding the SSA's official invitation dated 19 April 2012 (reached Station on 23 April) for a LS 826 delegation to visit South Africa. The invitation was delivered to LS 826's guesthouse on 25 April 2012.



- 1.3 Introduction to Head of liaison was followed by the normal niceties relating to how members are settling in Iran etc. He apologised that he was only able to meet members now for the first time. Furthermore reiterated that his service regards the SSA as friendly service, however the philosophy and justification of the relationship should be of mutual interest and cooperation should be beneficial to both services.
- trying to make i.e. lack of visible cooperation, in spite of the fact that HoS requested the meeting to discuss the invitation to South Africa. In a rather diplomatic manner he expressed his services dissatisfaction with cooperation between the two services and stated that in their evaluation nothing has improved compared to the past. Subsequently they had difficulty in explaining the benefit of the relation to their Ministry who insist on regular progress reports. He spoke for an extended period, elaborating that this relationship should become more meaningful, despite not tabling practical or concrete ways of doing so. He simply stated that we should find some creative initiatives to elevate the relationship.
- 1.4.1 He affirmed that compared to other declared services with whom they have interaction the level of cooperation with the SSA is regarded as the least meaningful at present, that this remains a question of concern at the Ministry in spite of the fact that the SSA had two persons in Iran. He appealed that a real effort be made to improve cooperation as he is expected to regularly update the Ministry of progress.
- HoS was given opportunity to respond and stated that it was a pity that since the first meeting beginning October 2011, it is only now that members were introduced to the Head of Liaison in spite of the fact that promises were made to facilitate such meetings speedily. Should these discussions have taken place earlier we could have agreed on a variety of more dynamic mechanisms, something which LS 826 liaison officers are reluctant to address. Since the first meeting LS 826 liaison officers have also been changed. HoS reminded that in spite of the lack of so-called high level cooperation it was only the SSA that provided a liaison document up until now.

- 1.5.1 HoS emphasised the fact that an undertaking made by HoS, since LS 826 basically retracted during the first meeting in October stating that the "ball was now in our court", culminated in a invitation to South Africa during which the Minister was prepared to meet their most senior representative and also allowing an opportunity for expert discussions.
- 1.5.2 HoS reiterated that the purpose for requesting the meeting was to gain feedback and a decision from LS 826 regarding the invitation extended to visit South Africa during the period June, July or August 2012. It however became obvious that this was not on agenda and he continued along the path of the perceived lack of cooperation.
- 1.6 He inter alia reiterated the following:
  - Once again highlighting LS 826's concern and reservations re the lack of due process
    that was followed culminating in the placement of two declared members in Iran.
     According to him this matter should have been clarified and agreed beforehand;
  - The current status quo is problematic to justify to the Ministry. He did however state
    that we should now accept this status quo try and put the matter behind us;
  - LS 826 should have been informed beforehand of the fact that HoS had Regional Responsibilities and would be travelling. He stated that perhaps they could have been of some assistance in this respect!
  - Stated that they had difficulties reaching HoS on two occasions, once when HoS travelled to Dubai and during the recent
  - They were at present not able to convey a positive assessment of cooperation between the respective services making it difficult to justify relations;
  - Stated that they will allow for a six month evaluation period before re-evaluating the continuation of the liaison relationship. Did not venture into what the consequences would be.
  - 1.6.1 Since the first meeting in October 2011 HoS explained (as instructed by HQ) in a very open fashion that we were two individuals at the Station and that it was part of the SSA deployment strategy. HoS provided short resumes of members, photographs and contact numbers as requested also informing them of the fact that HoS had regional responsibilities and would travel. HoS was at some stage thanked for being so open and transparent in this regard. During the visit to Dubai HoS telephonically spoke with LS 826 and requested that they postpone the North Africa briefing with two days (this was

the only initiative from their side thus fa	ir), this was agreed but never materialised. Two
days before departing for the	HoS telephoned the liaison officer to arrange a
meeting as to inform them of HoS's p	lanned absence and to obtain feedback re the
official invitation to visit South Africa.	The liaison officer, did not
respond.	

- On the most pressing question i.e. the invitation to South Africa LS 826 could still not provide an answer even though the document had been in their possession for a month.

  reverted by stating what they requested and would want to have interaction between the respective Ministers. This to him was seen as the first step which could be followed by expert exchange meetings thereafter. This in spite of the fact that it was previously agreed that the SSA would invite a high level delegation supplemented by experts to kick-start visible cooperation. From his comments it was obvious that was now shifting the goal posts pushing for a Minister to Minister meeting. HoS insisted on feedback as soon as possible which promised to provide but was not able to categorically state when.
- The meeting adjourned hastily with no concrete decisions or proposals besides to increase interaction or as stated by even if HoS meets their liaison officer to have a cup of tea (compliance). LS 826 undertook to convene a meeting soon to provide a briefing on North Africa and requested that HoS prepare for interactive participation.

#### 2. COMMENT

- 2.1 From the outset it was clear that this meeting was not intended to focus on the SSA invitation extended to LS 826 (enhancing cooperation), but rather to once again rehash the rational and lack of coordination between the services on a higher level leading to the placement of two members without their prior approval. It is furthermore blatantly obvious, something which members and most diplomats have become accustomed to dealing with Iranians; that blame is always one sided, they the Iranians are never in the wrong. As far as HoS is concerned this is cleverly being used to simply to leverage and push their agenda for a inter Ministerial meeting in South Africa, something that has been on their agenda for a long time.
- 2.2 In light of the above HoS is seriously concerned about the overt intentions of LS 826. As

in the discreet visit of the South African Minister of Energy earlier this year which was unnecessarily bloated all over the media, seemingly the only importance for LS 826 is to illustrate to the world that they are able to engage countries at the highest level, in this case something they would once again feel comfortable sharing with the media. The feeling one gets is that they are simply doing things to comply, the rest is actually irrelevant.

- 2.3 Unfortunately the fact remains that liaison cooperation and active interaction between the respective services is not what it should be, even historically and for a variety of reasons. One would over the medium term really have to consider the continued justification thereof and strategy to be followed. Until high level Ministerial interaction has taken place it is evident that this relationship in all honesty is doomed. This however is no guarantee that it would culminate in a dynamic liaison relationship.
- 2.4 For the interim HoS suggests first and foremost that a commitment from LS 826 be gained regarding the visit to South Africa. Once this has been received one would have a better idea on the way forward. In the mean time it would be appreciated if the Station could be provided with liaison documents, specific and detailed information requests in order to engage LS 826 (seeing they are complaining) and the North Africa briefing notes aimed at illustrating our seriousness. HoS is almost convinced that LS 826 would not be in a position to reciprocate over the short term.
- Thank you for your attention.

**END OF REPORT** 

#### MESSAGE FORM

1.	R4DE023	
2.	081230B	
3.	10 APRIL 2012	
4.	01 – 03	
5.	ROUTINE	

6.	EF10: EF21: TO:
7.	SECRET
8.	B14: LIASON ADMIN REPORT
9.	CONTACT REPORT
10.	IN/IC/OR

11.	DHOS EF21/4	
12.	EF21/4 SYRIA	
13.	EF21/4: IRANIAN LS CONTACT REPORT 08/05/2012	

- 1. The above refers.
- 2. Please find hereunder Liaison contact report referred to above.
- 3. Thank you for your attention.

APPROVED BY: HOS EF21/4

**END OF MESSAGE** 

2

#### STATE SECURITY AGENCY - FOREIGN BRANCH

#### LIAISON CONTACT

To COUNTRY MANAGER

#### Reference

Name of Liaison Service : Iranian Intelligence Representative Based In

Syria

Country : Islamic Republic of Iran, based in Damascus -

Syria

Name of SSA - FB member : (HOS) and R

Name of LS member(s) : (Councillor)

Date of meeting : 08 MAY 2012

Place of meeting : IRANIAN Embassy, Damascus


Type of meeting (Personal/Telephone) : Personal

Documents exchanged (yes/no) : NO

If yes - Specify document(s) : N/A

Other people/officials involved : No

Initiator of contact : DHoS)



- 1.1 The meeting was to introduce the HOS to the Intelligence representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Damascus, Syria), by DHoS.
- 2. Report
- 2.2. The meeting took place on Tuesday 08 May 2012 at 10:00 at the Iranian Embassy in Damascus.
- 2.3. A discussion was held around the current situation in Syria.
- 2.4. Informed the meeting that the Iranian Ambassador had within the past week met with the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Minister MIKDAD, who seemed very optimistic on the Syrian situation.
- 2.5. also informed the meeting that the Iranian Ambassador had recently (2-3 weeks ago) held a meeting with his Russian counterpart. The Russian Ambassador noted that until the end of the summer nothing will happen in Syria. The Russians believe that nothing will happen until the outcome of a report by Kofi Annan will be made. Further, they believe that if Annan condemns the Syrian regime this will be when the West will propose a new resolution in the UNSC. However, the Russians firmly believe that the Annan initiative must be implemented and supported. Thus far only point 2 of the 6 point plan is being monitored.
- 2.6. Itso mentioned that Iran has only met with the internal opposition groups. In particular they have met with the (Hayat Tansiq al-Wataniyah) National Coordinating Body/Committee (NCC/NCB). The Head of the NCC/NCB has also visited Iran on two occasions but the meetings were "fruitless". The reason for this was that the internal opposition is not fully representative of all opposition groups and the internal opposition groups were too weak.
- 2.7. confirmed that the Iranians have not met with any of the External opposition groups.
- 2.8. He also confirmed that the Syrian government is fully aware of the meetings with the opposition and wants mediation efforts to take place. He further mentioned that the Syrian government is serious to move forward with reforms.
- 2.9. further noted that the Syrian population have "legal demands" but that the reform process has to be carried out by the current government.
- 2.10. noted that the Economic situation in Syria is deteriorating day-by-day. He acknowledged that the sanctions continue to add to this problem. He identified key areas of concern, these included, Gas, Electricity and inflation. Further he noted that Syria was facing a 4 sided sanctions, this was from Turkey, the USA, the EU and from certain Arab countries.

- 2.11. Syrian government in this regard.
- 2.12. also noted that most Syrians were not supporting the opposition nor were they supporting the government. These people were all "witnessing" what was happening and will wait for whoever succeeds. He referred to this group as the "silent majority".
- 2.13. also mentioned that the security situation in Syria was very concerning and this placed severe limitations on the movement of Iranians. He said that they were confined to Damascus and did not leave the Damascus area due to safety concerns.
- 2.14. On the issue of Iran/USA talks (on nuclear energy) to be held in Baghdad at the end (23-25) May 2012, confirmed that the moving of the talks to Baghdad was a "gain" for Iran. Iran felt that break-troughs should not be made in Istanbul. However there were positive steps achieved in Istanbul. The Istanbul talks were a victory to Iran in the sense that there was agreement that Iran has a right to nuclear energy for civilian use. In Baghdad Iran will cooperate and a deal is expected.
- 2.15. The Arab League has called a meeting of the Syrian opposition in Cairo to discuss unity. This meeting will take place, in two weeks from this date. The external and internal opposition organizations have been invited to attend.
- 2.16. On the current discourse with the UAF on the visit of the Iranian president to the disputed islands in the Gulf as to where those disputed islands fall. He further intimated that the said islands belong to Iran. It is Iranians who reside there.
- Thank you for your attention.

END OF MESSAGE APPROVED BY: HOS EF21/4



#### Liaison Information Report

File reference:

6/1

Compilation Date:
Originating structure

Originating structure: LI10

Restriction:

SSA

2012/10/22

GENERAL MANAGER CI10
GENERAL MANAGER IM10

MANAGER CI20

LS825 (MOSSAD): LIAISON MEETING: 23 OCTOBER 2012

Venue

Liaison Centre

Time:

10:00

People Involved:

CI10

Head of LEVANT desk, FB Head Africa, LS825

Non-residential representative of LS825

Liaison Officer, SSA

#### 1. BACKGROUND

1.1 and were picked up at the Centurion Protea hotel at 9h00.

They wanted to have a short meeting before leaving for Musanda. It was the first time since the initial meeting met with He enquired what format the meeting will take as well as who will be present. On sensitizing them that a photo will be taken at the gate, said he got to the conclusion that the SSA was much more security conscious than LS 825. He said once they were accompanying a guest, the guest was free to move with the member freely.

#### 2. CONTACT DETAILS

2.1 LI10 opened the meeting by welcoming LS825 and said the meeting was to formally introduce the two parties to each other. He said the initial contact did not unfold well,

Document Number: 10000599586

Document Status: In Work

seeing the SSA was not sure if they indeed were talking with members from LS825. The protocol demanded by the SSA was that any representative of a FIS would formally introduce himself by way of handing over his credentials to the host country. This showed respect for the host country and the relationship could start on an equal and pleasant basis. The do's and don'ts is usually also explained during such a meeting. Due to circumstances this however did not happen and almost resulted in tarnishing the relationship before it even began. LI10 requested the letter of introduction from the relationship before it even began. LI10 requested the letter of introduction from the reacted by saying it was in the process of being signed by the DG, LS825. Indicated to LI10 that she did say it was a prerequisite for the meeting. LI10 manage to handle the situation quite diplomatically, but firmly, saying the letter is urgent and needs to accompany him the next time. (CI10) was introduced for further comments.


2.2 He reiterated what was said by L110 and said a liaison relationship starts gradually and both parties find an equal basis to work from. The SSA needs co-operation with LS825 on pre-decided topics and is ready to work together with LS825 on the following topics: - Counter Terrorism (CT)

- Counter Proliferation (CP)


Cl10 further said the SSA has its own pressing issues inside the country and has limited resources and must focus on those issues. If information is shared in time and communicated fully it will assist the SSA to respond better on requests. If the liaison relationship stays within the rules of the game, good co-operation could be expected from the SSA.

requested some time to respond. He said they did come to the meeting in good faith and almost admitted he was out of order the previous time. He explained how he came about calling the DG, SSA. (This was reported in an earlier report). He also said when the relationship between the two countries broke down; most of the organisational memory was also lost in the process. A lot of changes in both organisations have since taken place.

LS825 also had limited resources in Africa and need to cover the whole of Africa. They have the mind set of working where the co-operation is best and where the production shows promise.



Document Number: 10000599586 Document Status: In Work



As a result of this operation where South Africa also played a very important role, Iranian officials were arrested in Kenya with explosives. Many African countries feel betrayed by Iran in using their countries to build and execute terror attacks against foreign tourists and embassies.

On the managing of the HOS in Israel, said why they found it difficult was that they were mostly busy in Africa and sending emergency information through the HOS, meant first sending the information to the head office. He indicated again that they will be guided by the SSA as they were guests in South Africa and see how they can better the situation.

- 2.5 CI10 replied that the SSA was ready to work together on these issues, and could be motivated by more comprehensive information from the start and to include them in the whole picture from the inception. It is always better to respect the right operational channels and if LS825 is mindful of the constitution of South Africa co-operation will be good. If more information could be communicated in time which will enable the SSA to position their operations and resources according to the need.
- 2.6 said it was very clear and believed their challenges in Africa was Iran and the proliferation of weapons, the use of HIZBOLLAH on the continent to their advantage, HAMAS and the obtaining of weapons via Sudan to the Gaza strip, especially missiles and AK'47s. With the peace process in Sudan weapons are smuggled to Gaza. The other priorities to LS825 in Africa are M23, AI SHABA'AB and GLOBAL JIHAD. He highlighted the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD with their agenda in the whole of Africa and especially in the North and Horn of Africa as well as Togo, Ivory Coast, Mali from Libya and the Darfur and Eritrea region. Many of these weapon smuggling routes are also people smuggling routes. He said it was terrible how these poor people were treated on these routes.

Document Number: 10000599586 Document Status: In Work

2.7 LI10 reiterated the significance of the introduction of a representative and to ensure the same treatment that he enjoys in South Africa be granted to the HOS in the other country.

2.8 I agreed and said plans should be made to arrange for an analysts' exchange on the topics agreed upon. The HOS in Israel could be engaged in managing this as soon as meets with him.

#### 2. COMMENTS BY LIAISON OFFICER

- 2.1 The two LS825 members were taken back to the hotel and stated they were glad that the air has been cleared. They experienced the meeting as to the point, but felt positive regarding the future co-operation between the services.
- 2.2 The liaison officer was requested by to have a meeting on 25 October 2012 to recap what was said and the way forward. She met him at the hotel at 19h00. In the meeting and indicated she will forward requests through the FB, HOS.

  said he planned to visit sometime in November 2012 and will let know in advance.
- 2.3 The following documents were handed over:
  - -Weekly Middle Eastern Intelligence
  - -South Africa Overview
  - -Iran/Nuclear/Program Status
  - -Syria/Political Situation Picture Correct to 2 October 2012

All the above are attached, as well as the pictures and details obtained from the main gate at Musanda.

2.4 The report serves to inform CDCI that contact with a member of FIS was made.

LIAISON OFFICER

3. COMMENTS BY LI10





#### Liaison Information Report

File reference: 1/

Compilation Date: 2003/11/18

Originating structure: Data Warehouse and Registry IM

Restriction: PROCESS FIS

DEPUTY HEAD EM30: Attention
GENERAL MANAGER CI10: Attention
GENERAL MANAGER IM10: Attention

LS825: LIAISON CONTACT 2010 AUGUST 18

PERSONS INVOLVED:

Non-Resident Representative

Liaison Officer

VENUE:

CASTLE WALK

TIME: 09: 00 - 10:00

#### 1. DETAILS OF THE MEETING

- 1.1 The meeting was arranged telephonically between
  Representative of MOSSAD and the Liaison Officer prior to prior to arrival from Tel
  Aviv, Israel of prior to prior to prior to arrival from Tel
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  Aviv, Israel of prior to p
- mentioned that MOSSAD has secured the Macopa missile plans from Mr
  TILIA and they would return them to the SSA Domestic Branch. However, he
  mentioned that there are conditions attached to the MOSSAD's cooperation which is
  spelt out in the attachment. Further, he mentioned that if the conditions are not
  acceptable to the SSA Domestic Branch MOSSAD advice that the matter could be
  taken up between the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and their
  counterparts in Israel.



Document Number: 10005 Document Status: In Work

nentioned that evidence coming out from the three terror attacks carried out in Kampala, Uganda in July 2010 and were claimed by Al Shabaab Somalia has demonstrate connections with Al Qaeda. He indicated the investigation that followed found a vest stuffed with explosives failed to detonate and a switch in one of the terror scenes and it was determined that mobile could have been used also by the bombers. He volunteered to give a briefing to the SSA Domestic Branch Counter Terrorism (CT) Unit next time he returns to South Africa on the Kampala terror attacks information at the disposal of MOSSAD.

- again mentioned that invitation to Mr NJENJE, the Head SSA Domestic Branch from MOSSAD Director did not receive feedback. He mentioned that Mr Mo SHAIK, the Head SSA External Branch has also not responded to the MOSSAD Director invitation. He mentioned that the MOSSAD Director was hoping to use the meeting with Mr NJENJE and Mr SHAIK to improve cooperation on intelligence issue between South Africa and Israel.
- 1.5 The Liaison Officer advised that perhaps the MOSSAD Director should direct invitation to Mr MAQETUKA, the Director General of the SSA Domestic Branch if the objective of the envisaged visit would deliberate on improving and strengthening relations. He expressed hope that the SSA Domestic Branch CT would appreciate his initiative to offer a briefing on terror attacks in Kampala and modus operandi of Al Shabaab.
- 2. DOCUMENT/S EXCHANGED
- 2.1 MACOPA MISSILE PLANS report number: 5896.
- 3. COMMENTS BY THE LIAISON OFFICER
- mentioned the difficulties confronting MOSSAD in dealing with Mr TALIA since crime was committed outside Israel. He pointed to impediment presented by the Israeli Constitution and the protection it afforded to the Israeli citizen.

LIAISON OFFICER

4. COMMENT/S BY EM41





#### Liaison Information Report

File reference:

6/1

Compilation Date:

2012/11/22

Originating structure: Foreign Intelligence Liaison E

NIA ONLY

GENERAL MANAGER CI10 GENERAL MANAGER CTU MANAGER CI20 MANAGER CI30 MANAGER IM20

LS879 (PAL): LIAISON MEETING: 17 and 20 NOVEMBER 2012

Venues:

The TeaCoffee Cafe

Time:

10:00 and 15h00

People Involved:

local representative of LS879

Liaison Officer, SSA

#### CONTACT DETAILS

- requested both meetings regarding the situation in Gaza. enquired about his family who she knows live in Gaza. He says there is actually no place safe in the whole of Gaza. They are like trapped rats on a boat. They are attacked from the sea as well as from the Israeli side on both fronts.
- 1.2 After the killing of HAMAS's deputy military chief on 14 November 2012 rockets were fired from GAZA as way to defend themselves. These were fired from Gaza and the Sinai. Ahmed Al-JAABARI was the head of the military wing of HAMAS in the Gaza strip. The EZZEDINE AL-QASSAM brigades were especially touched by the passing of their leader, according to 1 He was a prisoner in Israel since 1982 and joined HAMAS when he was released. Although AL-JAABARI is not the official leader, he was seen as the "General". The official leader is Mohammed DEIF. He also lost his eldest son, his brother and several cousins in air raids and assassinations. He appeared in public when he handed the Israeli soldier Gilad SHALIT over to the Egyptian mediators.



#### [SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

2

Document Number: 10000607573 Document Status: In Work

1.3 handed over some documentation regarding the Palestine plans at the UNITED NATIONS (UN) on 29 November 2012. They were quite adamant to go ahead with their bid at the UN. (Documents attached)

- 1.4 A memo regarding a phone call made between Pres. OBAMA and Pres. ABBAS where Pres. OBAMA threatened Pres. ABBAS if he goes ahead with the UN bid. (Memo attached)
- 2. COMMENTS BY LIAISON OFFICER
- 2.1 Feedback on the names regarding the "Support Group" is still outstanding.
- 2.2 An invitation by the rep to invite to lunch also needs to be arranged when they are available.
- 2.3 The rep and property and the street almost in daily telephonic contact where she tries and boost his morale and enquire about his family and the situation at home.
- 2.4 The report serves to inform CDCI that contact with a member of FIS was made.

LIAISON OFFICER

3. COMMENTS BY LI10

3.1

GENERAL MANAGER: LIAISON AND PROTOCOL SERVICES



#### STATE SECURITY AGENCY

#### LIAISON CONTACT REPORT

To : COUNTRY MANAGER EF21

Reference : SSA/EF21/2/EL/LS/VI (LS 879)

Date : 05 NOVEMBER 2012

Name of LS member(s)

Name of Liaison Service : PALESTINIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE (PGI)

Country : PALESTINE

Name of SSA member(s)

Date of meeting : 02 NOVEMBER 2012

Place of meeting : PGIS HEAD OFFICE

Type of meeting (Personal/Telephone): PERSONAL

Documents exchanged (yes/no) : NONE

If yes - Specify document(s) : N/A

Other people/officials involved : None

Initiator of contact : SSA

### 1. PURPOSE

The purpose of initiating contact with PGIS was to arrange for a courtesy visit to offices of PGIS by visiting General Manager EF10 and Country Manager EF21.

2.	REPORT
2.1	The Head of PGIS International Relations, accompanied by
	the Head of PGIS Analysis and liaison Officer
	received the SSA delegation comprising of and
2.2	PGIS put on the table five agenda items that they wished to be discussed. The points were:
	PGIS Concerns towards SSA
	Possible Analysis Experts Exchange Visits,
	Training
	Provision of technical equipment to police forensic laboratory in Jericho.
	Any Other Business (AOB
2.3	SSA delegation requested that the points raised be put on hold until a formal session is
	agreed upon. Speaking on behalf of the SSA delegation thanked PGIS for
	making time to meet with her delegation. She went on to explain that the reason for her
	visit to Palestine was to familiarise herself with the region.
2.4	PGIS analysts gave a comprehensive presentation on the growing threat posed by the
2.4	Salafists, Al-Qaida network and the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Report on the
	deliberations is contained in IIR with message number 2I2K007.L4H.
2.5	At the end of the presentation, process once more thanked the PGIS for receiving her
	delegation and assured them that efforts will be made to have a formal engagements
ANI	on issues tabled.
20	DOLC presented the CCA delegation with DOLC plagues, CCA did not have gifts to
2.6	PGIS presented the SSA delegation with PGIS plaques. SSA did not have gifts to exchange.
	CACHAINS.
11.	OBSERVATIONS

PGIS Analysts came across as being well informed on their areas of focus. An Analysis exchange would go a long way in cementing fragile relations that exist currently.

#### 12. REMARKS

12.1 PGIS officials had wished to engage on the outstanding matter of SSA officials engaging Hamas. The attitude displayed is the same as what the Mission experiences on regular basis when meetings are held with Hamas or travel to Gaza. HOM has received several protests notes indicating their disapproval of SA engaging with Hamas.

This matter is on the agenda of the upcoming visit by the SA Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Relations due in Palestine on 01-07 December 2012.

13. Thank you for your attention.



#### IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

October 1, 2012

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#### IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

October 1, 2012

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

This paper provides an overview of Iran's primary foreign objectives vis- $\acute{\alpha}$ -vis Africa as well as the role of Iranian intelligence institutions, cultural ministries and agencies as well as economic foundations (bonyads) in realising these goals in Africa.

#### 2. IRAN'S PRIMARY FOREIGN OBJECTIVES

The basis of Iran's foreign policy is described in article 152 of the Iranian constitution as the "Preservation of independence…its territorial integrity and the defence of the rights of all Muslims". It is based on the former Supreme Religious Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of velayat-e-faqih ("Supreme Religious Guardianship"), or the right of clerics to rule over the Islamic community. This implies enforcing absolute authority over the populace, and extending this authority to all Muslims, i.e. "exporting the revolution" to support their co-religious supporters abroad. According to the Iranian interpretation, Muslims throughout the world constitute a single community – the Ummah – who must be ruled by a single government. Thus the religious leaders of Iran assert that by virtue of the 1979 revolution they have acquired the status of "guardians" of all Muslims throughout the world.

#### 2.1 Primary foreign objectives vis-ά-vis Africa

Contrary to official Iranian rhetoric, which describes its relations with Africa as "enduring and solid", the opposite is true, namely that Africa is not high on Iran's list of foreign policy priorities. However, Iran changed its focus in the last couple of years because it believes that growing involvement in Africa will enable Iran to break from international isolation and rival the West.

A clear distinction in policy vis-à-vis Africa can be made between the successive administrations of President Mohammad Khatami (1998-2005) and the administrations of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-beginning of 2013). Common to both periods are the objectives of expansion of Islam in East and West Africa, and promoting economic interests in Southern Africa. However, a shift occurred during the Khatami administration with Iran becoming more pragmatic, while it exchange the rhetoric of the revolution with détente and cooperation to realise its national, especially economic interests, in Africa. At the time

October 1, 2012


Khatami identified the "driving forces" of his policies as comprising three elements:

- ✓ A "dialogue between "Civilizations" on the international level;
- √ "Détente" with neighbouring nations;
- ✓ Establishing and broadening international contacts via the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

This trend continued under Ahmadinejad until 2010/11 when the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reasserted the hard-line approach and reaffirmed and enhanced Iran's relations with Islamist movements and networks with the capacity of destabilising those countries closely aligned with the USA and its allies. This forms part of the Iranian strategy to counter USA initiatives and the international sanction regime against Iran.

#### 3. AGENCIES INVOLVED IN AFRICA

A variety of organisations are concerned with realising the Iranian objectives in Africa.



October 1, 2012

# 3.1 The role of the intelligence ministries

The Iranian intelligence /security establishment exists in broad terms of a plethora of religious-revolutionary committees, military and policing structures as well as political and economic institutions. However, cohesion and co-ordination are insufficient and their reporting structures too varying to describe them as being part of an "intelligence or security community" in the true sense of the word. It would be more correct to describe Iran as having a complicated network of security and military organisations that coexist and supervise each other. The reasons for this situation can be found in the Islamic revolution of 1979 when the new clerical establishment did not destroy the imperial structures that were in place, but added an additional layer or parallel structures loyal to the new revolutionary government. As a result all political, security-military and intelligence institutions were given clerically controlled supervisory bodies, which have the defence of Islam and the revolution as their principal objective. In short, within the Iranian system one set of institutions would report to the president as the political, but relatively powerless, figurehead, while the religious-supervisory bodies report directly and only to the Supreme Religious Leader who has ultimate control.

The resulting dualism has over the years caused much friction between the president and the Supreme Religious Leader. For example, during the Khatami years there was intense competition with the more pragmatic and reformist Khatami and his supporters, before Khamenei ultimately regained control over the security, intelligence and military structures and decision making processes. This situation changed during the administration of Ahmadineiad. While Ahmadineiad and Khamenei at first worked in tandem (until around 2009/2010), the situation changed after the start of Ahmadineiad's second term when the two leaders came into direct conflict when Ahmadinejad and his innercircle attempted to enhance direct presidential control over the intelligence establishment. This led to intense competition and the current situation where formal intelligence structures appear to be of lesser importance when compared to Khamenei's current committee system, headed by Sa'eed Jalili, the chief nuclear negotiator and Secretary General of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) the main body responsible for oversight as well as defence and nuclear decision-making. This infighting has resulted in contradictory strategies being adopted (also in Africa) by the said leaders or initiatives by Khamenei to overrule the strategies previously adopted by Ahmadinejad.

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# The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)

MOIS remains the leading Iranian intelligence structure despite the current confusion regarding attempts by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its intelligence service — Sazemane Ye Ete'elaate Sepah Pasdaran Enghelobi Eshlam — that is attempting an intelligence take-over. This implies the creation of one integrated Iranian intelligence service under IRGC control, which would report directly to the Supreme Leader. However, this objective has not yet been realised and Khamenei appears to prefer the committee system referred to above.

MOIS' primary responsibilities<sup>1</sup> are multi-fold, while it also closely cooperates with other members of the Iranian "intelligence or security community" such as: the IRGC, the *AI Qods* or Special Forces of the IRGC, J2 (a training and logistical structure in the Iranian military) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as well as cultural ministries and economic foundations for cover purposes. In addition to MOIS-controlled operations and assets, MOIS is also involved in some joint operations with the IRGC *I AI Quds* and also proxy forces like Hezbollah.

# Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

MOFA's role in foreign policy making is limited – it is mostly decided upon at the SNSC-level, which emphasises that MOFA's role is primarily to implement foreign policy, also with regard to Africa. It plays a key role in the export of the Iranian revolution. Iranian embassies are also used by members of other departments e.g. the IRGC, its AI Quds Forces, members of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence Abroad and the

Additional responsibilities not mentioned in the constitution are:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Iranian Constitution describes MOIS's responsibilities as:

The gathering and assessing of information.

Imposing Khomeini's philosophy of *Velayat-e Faqih*, or "Islamic Rule," on the Islamic Republic of Iran. This implies enforcing absolute religious authority over the populace, and extending this authority to all Muslims, e.g. "exporting the revolution" to support their co-religious supporters abroad.

Support of Iran's foreign policy interests.

Collecting intelligence, engaging in liaison and supporting operations in relation to Islamic fundamentalist movements.

Suppressing Iranian dissident organisations.

To act as coordinator of all intelligence (security, military and intelligence).

Act as "leading" organisation of all intelligence activities.

To be the custodian of all security and intelligence files.

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Committee on the Implementation of Actions Abroad as well as the Ministry of Guidance and Propaganda.

Iranian embassies' fulfil a central role in the Iranian intelligence process throughout the world, also in Africa. Apart from its traditional official functions, embassies also provide official and non-official cover for operations executed from Iranian embassies, consulates, overseas branches of the *bonyads*, Iranian businesses (the carpet industry is a popular one), mosques and Islamic Cultural Centres outside Iran. Cultural Centres in particular is important for the distribution of funds to groups such as Hezbollah, which support Iranian national interests. Due to the current economic sanction regime against Iran the importance of the *bonyads*' will increase since they have huge investments outside Iran and control over hundreds of companies, which could be used to avoid sanctions.

MOIS operatives also work under the guise of the Ministry of Guidance and Propaganda, employ cover with Iran Air [the official airline of Iran], act as students, and as members of opposition groups. A primary focus is to spread Iranian influence through local Islamic communities, collecting information on science and technology, infiltrating and influencing local Muslim communities in foreign states, and procuring military hardware.

# Role of cultural ministries and agencies

The overall responsibility for the propagation of Iran's revolutionary message lies with the *Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance* (*MICG*). The specific task of spreading the Islamic revolution abroad rests on the *Islamic Cultural Relations Organisation (ICRO)*. ICRO's primary tasking is to direct and control the dissemination of pro-Iranian and Shi'a propaganda in foreign countries, including the building of amongst others mosques, cultural centres and schools. ICRO is further involved in establishing cultural ties with countries and organising conferences. Cultural attaché's, stationed in Iranian embassies are charged with enhancing ties with Muslim communities and people of Iranian origin, while students are recruited for Islamic studies in Iransometimes by offering free bursaries for any studies in Iran. The MOIS is usually involved in the activities of ICRO and uses the ICRO to conduct talent spotting for the recruitment of sources and to establish contacts with Shi'a and/or pro-Iranian groupings in foreign countries.

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The Islamic Propagation Centre (IPO) is another cultural agency with close contact with the MICG. The IPO was formed shortly after the Iranian revolution in 1979 to promote Twelver Shi'ism as the official Iranian religion or ideology. IPO distributes books, leaflets, and tapes, and promotes Shi'ism through the electronic and printed media. The IPO works in close coordination with cultural centres and attaché's abroad and also sends clergy abroad to disseminate revolutionary ideology, creating a network of pro-Iranian clergy.

Working in unison with the IPO and ICRO, is the *Ahl al-Buyt* (Family of the Prophet), which was established in 1990. Although the *Ahl al-Buyt* describes itself as an academic research body, studying Shia Islam, it is internationally involved in 1) promoting Shi'ism and increasing Shia influences in traditionally Sunni communities, 2) the dissemination of Iranian propaganda and 3) promoting the concept of an Islamic revolution. The *Ahl al-Buyt* is specifically active among poorer communities, will usually establish cultural centres and/or Muslim schools and will liaise with the Iranian cultural attaché, if a country has diplomatic ties with Iran. The *Ahl al-Buyt* also works in unison with the MOIS to collect information, do talent spotting or to radicalise Muslim communities. It has offices around the world and in Africa respectively, in Senegal, Uganda, Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa.

## Role of Iranian foundations (bonyads)

Bonyads came into being after the revolution to administer the Pahlavi Foundation or funds from the former government. Over time bonyads developed in vast conglomerates with a controlling interest over approximately 40% of the Iranian economy. The most important bonyad and presently the most influential one is the Bonyad-e Mostaz'afin or (Foundation for the Poor and Suppressed and War-wounded), which reports directly to Khamenei. Due to its controlling stake in the Iranian economy the bonyad also plays a key role in foreign and security policy and directly transferred funds from its own coffers to Khamenei. Bonyads are also used as cover structures for intelligence operations and the channelling of funds to proxy groups like Hezbollah.

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# 4. FOCUSES OF IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

# Exporting the revolution and Shi'a Islam in Africa

This objective remains a traditional focus of Iran, but is constrained by the religious differences between Shi'a Iran and Africa where the majority of the *Ummah* adheres to the Sunni strain of Islam.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, Iranian influence is limited to those areas where there are Shi'a communities. Main groups are found in East and West Africa (e.g. Tanzania, Zanzibar, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger and Guinea) where Shi'a communities have settled and emerged as the driving force behind the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. As a result of Iranian influence, Shi'a Lebanese are invariably Hezbollah supporters.

While a sustained religious campaign is currently visible in e.g. Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Tanzania / Zanzibar, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt – the respective conflicts are either part of the current "Arab transformation" or part of the fall-out of these changes. It is mainly Sunni-driven and has resulted in the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi groups throughout the MENA-region. It should also be noted that Iran is increasingly competing with Saudi Arabia who is attempting to broaden its own religious (Wahabi / Salafist) and economic footprint in North Africa. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are also of increasing importance in this regard. However, Iranian advancement of this focus is coincidental since its revolutionary aim is closely tied to its economic interests – currently of growing importance to Iran.

Presently, Iran's attempts are focused on Libya – where it lost ground after the people's revolution and it is now attempting to re-establish a foothold through support (e.g. funding and training) to a variety of Islamist elements both in and outside government. However, Iran's main focus currently appears to be Egypt. Relations were severed by Iran after Egypt signed the 1979 peace treaty with Israel and were exacerbated by the late President Anwar Sadat's hosting of the deposed Shah of Iran. For the past few years, however, both countries have been preparing the way for a restoration of relations. The presidential victory of Mohamed Mursi, as the Brotherhood's candidate in June 2012 gave new impetus to this process and adds pressure on Israel and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Statistics to make a clear distinction between the two schools are absent, but 2009 statistics reveals that the Muslim population in Africa stands at about 27% or 446 million out of a total African population of 1.02 billion people.

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particularly, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Egypt also gave Iranian ships passage through the Suez (just after the political change in Cairo), thus allowing Iran to illustrate to Israel and the USA its increasing capacity to pressurise Israel from nearby. This objective of Iran thus eventually permits Iran to counter Israel-USA initiatives against Iran.

# Enhancing political and diplomatic support for Iran

This focus involves most African countries since Iran requires support from the international community at large in international forums such as the UN General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to counter the Western initiated sanction regime against Iran. A particular requirement is to ensure support for Iran's right to develop a "full national nuclear fuel cycle", (in other words its "inalienable" right to nuclear technology and the conversion of uranium).

# Enhance economic opportunities in Africa

Growing Iranian economic opportunities was the key to Iran's involvement in Africa from the time that the first Persian / Shi'a communities arrived in particularly, East Africa as far back as the 10<sup>th</sup> century – a focus that has grown in importance as Western pressure on Iran continues.

Iran's economic involvement in Africa encompasses the whole of Africa with key countries in each region. For example: Tanzania, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya in East Africa; Algeria and Morocco in North Africa and Nigeria and Senegal in West Africa. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in central Africa and Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa in southern Africa are the other foci of Iranian foreign policy.

However, this list should not be seen as complete or exclusive of any other African country since Iran is utilising every opportunity to advance its economic interests on the continent.

Typical of the Iranian involvement in the mentioned countries are: The establishment of Joint Commissions and the signing of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to enhance political, economic, trade, mining, scientific, agricultural, health, education and military cooperation with its African counterparts. It also includes joint projects — to source scarce minerals, the training of African military personnel (either locally or in

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Iran) and construction projects by the Iranian *Construction Jihad* – also serving as front organisation - of for example, harbours and refineries in Mozambique.

High-level visits to Africa also take place on a regular basis including by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to attend to bilateral affairs, conferences and summits. A number of Presidential visits, by both Khatami and Ahmadinejad have also taken place during their respective administrations, mainly to the primary countries above.

Iran also provides weapons to African countries. However, the West and some African countries perceive this to be arms smuggling and Gambia has for example, severed its relations with Tehran in November 2010 after Nigeria intercepted Iranian weaponry, which was apparently destined for the Casamanche secessionist rebels in southern Senegal. It is also alleged that Iranian weaponry is smuggled from Sudan via Egypt (the Sinai) to the Gaza to assist Hamas in its struggle against Israel.

# Counter the increasing USA-Israeli threat

Iran has intensified its economic activities in Africa due to the changing international environment (e.g. the increasing international sanction regime and the threat of an Israeli-USA counter-proliferation strike against Tehran). Its objectives are three-fold:

- ✓ To find and ensure alternative markets for Iranian oil and gas products. Iran is apparently also searching for storage depots for its oil on especially, the East coast of Africa.
- ✓ Gain African support for the continuation of Iranian export activities. In this regard Iran has for example, received permission from Zanzibar (and probably some other African countries) to reflag its oil tanker fleet. Zanzibar has allowed Iran to re-flag more than 150 of its ships. However, this Iranian attempt failed when Tanzania was threatened with targeted economic sanctions by the USA in August 2012. Consequently, Tanzania forced Zanzibar to end this practice. Note: To increase the Iranian capacity at avoiding sanctions and gain access to markets and technology Iran has recently decided to deploy IRGC officials in its embassies in key countries with that particular objective.

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- ✓ Searching for alternative uranium sources. Iran continues with its search for alternative sources for uranium since its own stocks are of poor quality and almost depleted. Three countries are of importance: South Africa, who is not willing to supply Iran again; Algeria which has its own IAEA supervised nuclear programme and is a close supporter of the Iranian quest to develop an independent peaceful nuclear capacity and Zimbabwe. The latter is of particular importance since it agreed in 2011 during the visit by President Ahmadinejad to Zimbabwe to supply Tehran with the required resource. Note: There is currently no evidence if this agreement has been activated.
- Enhancing its support for international terrorist groups and networks in Africa

As international pressure mounts on Iran, it has become increasingly involved in exploiting the disorganisation within Al Qaeda, after the death of Osama bin Laden, to its own advantage. As a result Iran has launched a comprehensive strategy regarding the African and Muslim worlds. It entails the following:

- The creation of a new international extremist network in which Iran could exert influence and control. To realize this objective Iran ordered its operatives in Africa to engage and organize as many of the terrorist movements as possible so as to fill the increasing vacuum left by Al Qaeda's deterioration. Al Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) are the primary targets of this initiative.
- ✓ Africa was decided upon as the key experimental focus for Iran's initiative to create a coordinated and integrated internationally driven and orientated "terrorist movement". Africa was also described by key Iranian officials "as the new war zone for terrorism". Senegal, Mali and the Horn of Africa were identified as key zones where "terrorism" could rapidly be revived and organized to advance Iranian interests.
- Operations in Africa are the first and primary objective, but the intention is to expand later to other areas such as the USA, the UK, Germany, France and Israel.

Since a detailed discussion of terrorism falls outside the scope of this paper, it is important to conclude by emphasizing that Iranian supported

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or funded terrorist activities have increased since 2011 when this initiative was first uncovered. Additionally, networks throughout Mauritania, Mali, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Somalia have become increasingly active. Sophisticated arms from the former Colonel Ghaddafi's armoury have also ended up in the hands of terrorist groups, particularly in Mali where it has led to a total deterioration of the political and security situation.

Further, it has already led to greater cooperation between key terrorist movements based in Asia, the Middle East and in Africa. For example, Al Qaeda in consultation with movements like Al Shaba'ab, Hisbul al-Islam and others have decided to loosely join forces for the sake of expanding and enhancing the global terrorist network.

#### 5. KEY OBSERVATIONS

Based on the above and particularly, the changes in the international environment it is possible to make three basic observations:

- The Iranian modus operandi discussed above has remained broadly unchanged although a shift is becoming visible towards enhanced IRGC involvement and an increase in the importance of business / economic related activities.
- The status of Africa, like Latin America, has been elevated given Iran's increasing attempts to avoid the impact of the growing sanction regime.
- Africa has been selected to become the primary zone of conflict with the West in an attempt to advance Iranian foreign policy and intelligence objectives.



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### SECRET UK/SA EYES ONLY

Our Ref: 684

Date: 17 November 2009

#### ERFCO FURNACES: FCO TO APPROACH DIRCO

 For your information please find attached a copy of a note which the FCO intend to pass to DIRCO regarding ERFCO Furnaces. FCO will request that DIRCO take action with ERFCO in order to halt their business dealings with Iran.

SECRET UK/SA EYES ONLY

#### SECRET

16 November 2009

To whom it may concern DIRCO

# URGENT REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO HALT ERFCO FURNACES SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT TO IRAN

- 1. An Iranian entity known as LMI is in the advanced stages of procuring a furnace and accessories from the South African company Electric Resistance Furnaces SA (ERFCO). According to reliable reporting, LMI is a front company set up by the Iranian Shahid Sattari Ground Equipment Industries (SSGEI) organisation, which is responsible for the production of missile launchers and ground support equipment and is involved in the development of rocket bodies. SSGEI is subordinate to the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid-propelled ballistic missile programme and was designated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737.
- 2. Details of the furnace and accessories are unavailable. Whilst however it may not be controlled in its own right, it is known that it will significantly enhance Iran's ability to produce ballistic missiles, including some which would be suitable for carrying nuclear warheads.
- 3. According to further reliable reporting the Iranian Esfahan Steel Alloy Complex, which is working closely with SSGEI and is acting as LMI, is expecting a visit towards the end of November 2009 by dual UK/South African citizen

already in Iran. He is to be accompanied by another individual who previously worked for ERFCO and is now based in Europe. Esfahan Steel were expecting deliveries of equipment which is probably Programmable Logic Controller(PLC)-related from ERFCO in early November. Esfahan Steel/LMI are expecting a further visit by ERFCO personnel in January 2010 for final start-up of the equipment provided by ERFCO.

- 4. According to reporting from a separate source, Iranian entities associated with the Iranian Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) made payments to ERFCO totalling between 500,000 and one million US dollars and/or Euros between late 2007 and early 2009. The DIO too was designated under UNSCR 1737.
- 5. In view of the above, and in the light of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, we would be grateful for any action you may be able to take under your export licensing laws to prevent the proposed visits going ahead, and any other dealings ERFCO and other South African entities may have with Esfahan Steel/LMI. We believe such action would be consistent with South Africa's international obligations, as it would be with ours.

#### SECRET UK/SOUTH AFRICA

Ref: CI/NIA09/002

11 November 2009

# WRITE-IN CLAIMS KNOWLEDGE OF EXTREMIST ACTIVITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

- 1. We are writing to inform your Service of an individual based in Durban, South Africa that claims to have knowledge of extremist activity.
- 2. The individual's name is the claims to be a recent convert to Islam and recently contacted our service via email address
- 3. Informed our service of a radical Sheikh called who is radicalising youths in the Durban area. We have alleges that will travel to Somalia at the end of this month.
- 4. Leads informed us of a number of youths that he believed to have travelled to Kandahar. They were called In addition he claimed there are several youths currently undergoing pilot training before travelling to an undisclosed location in Europe.
- 5. Our service would be grateful if you could provide any further information either on the originator of the email or the individuals listed within. We intend to continue to communicate with the country in order to further assess his access and would be grateful for your Services assistance with this.



SECRET UK/SOUTH AFRICA

#### SECRET UK/SOUTH AFRICA

Ref: CI/NIA 09/001

11 November 2009

#### REQUEST FOR SUBSCRIBER DETAILS

The following intelligence must be handled in accordance with the procedures set down in the British High Commission Guidance note, of 4 August 2006, on handling UK Intelligence derived from intercept.

Reference: 811532 2009/1

- Intercept shows that Somali mobile was in contact with South African mobiles during the period of 1 March to 1 June 2009.
- 2. Somali mobile who is involved in the running of an Al-Qa'ida linked camp in Somalia. Is a senior al-Shabaab member and Al-Qa'ida associate. formally acted as a bodyguard for (now deceased) AQ operative in East Africa He was also actively involved in the running of the insurgency in Mogadishu in 2007-8 prior to the Ethiopian troop withdrawal.
- 3. We would be grateful for subscriber details, traces and 30 days call records analysis on South African numbers



SECRET UK/SOUTH AFRICA