#### TOP-SECRET

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DATE

4 AUGUST 2014

REPORT NO. 6180

URGENCY

SUBJECT

TERROR/POSSIBLE ATTACK INTENTIONS AGAINST SYNAGOGUES IN SOUTH AFRICA IN SEPTEMBER 2014/BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENT

- 1. A HUMINT SOURCE OF UNCLEAR RELIABILITY INDICATES PLANS BY AL-QAEDA ELEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA TO ATTACK SYNAGOGUES WITH CAR BOMBS DURING SEPTEMBER 2014.
- 2. WE ASSESS THAT REFERENCE IS TO ROSH HASHANA, THE JEWISH NEW YEAR, WHICH WILL OCCUR ON 24-26 SEPTEMBER 2014, OR ALTERNATIVELY TO SABBATH (SATURDAY) PRAYERS IN THE SYNAGOGUES DURING SEPTEMBER.
- WE HAVE NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONFIRMING THIS REPORT, 3. AND ARE ATTEMPTING TO VERIFY IT.
- SINCE THIS IS ALERT INFORMATION REGARDING AL-QAEDA ELEMENTS, WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO RECEIVING YOUR COMMENTS ON THE REPORT ABOUT POSSIBLE ATTACK PLANS IN YOUR COUNTRY.

#### TOP-SECRET

- 5. DO YOU HAVE ADDITIONAL INDICATIONS OF ATTACK PLANS AGAINST JEWISH TARGETS IN SOUTH AFRICA LINKED TO AL-QAEDA OR THE SOMALI ORGANIZATION AL-SHABAB? IF SO:
  - A. WHO IS BEHIND THE ATTACK PLANS: NAMES, CONTACT DETAILS, DOCUMENTATION DETAILS, NATIONALITY, ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION?
  - B. WHICH SYNAGOGUES IN SOUTH AFRICA MAY BE TARGETED FOR ATTACK?
  - 6. IN ANY CASE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING DETAILS ON AL-QAEDA OR AL-SHABAB ELEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA WHO MAY BE TIED TO THE ATTACK PLANS AGAINST JEWISH TARGETS IN THE ARENA: NAMES, CONTACT DETAILS, DOCUMENTATION DETAILS, NATIONALITY, ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION.
  - 7. THANK YOU FOR YOUR PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION. REGARDS.

# ALJAZEERA

#### CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, ZAF, UK, AUS

Draft 26 January 2011

#### PROSPECTS FOR RAMPING UP RENEWABLES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Executive Summary [CIA lead]

Scope Note [CIA lead]

-Identify this as a joint intelligence product (UK, S. Africa, Australia, US)
-Focus is on wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal for electricity generation and alternative fuels for transportation

Introduction: Renewables Begin From Small Base [CIA lead]

- -Reasons for ramping up use of renewables
- -IEA/international forecasts to 2030
- -Challenges/costs ahead

Adoption Potential, Approaches Vary By Region [Joint]

-Introduction Foci, targets, and investments will vary

-EU/UK [CIA lead] Carbon capture and storage Wind and solar Biofuels

-South Africa [South Africa lead]
Alternative fuels (including coal to liquids and gas to liquids)
Solar and wind

-Australia [Australia lead] Alternative fuels (including coal to liquids and gas to liquids) Solar and wind RA

-N. America [CIA lead] Renewables Oil sands

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, ZAF, UK, AUS

#### CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, ZAF, UK, AUS

## Renewables Critical in Meeting Climate Targets [Joint]

-Examines the required role for renewables in reducing CO2 and GHGs

## Alternative Fuels for Transport to Offset Oil [CIA, South Africa, UK lead]

- -Examines potential for unconventional sources of oil (incl. gas-to-oil, coal-to-oil, and biofuels)
- -Discusses required market and price incentives

## Future Contingent on Key Technologies [Joint]

- -Smart grids and meters
- -Low energy-intensive building materials
- -Energy storage
- -Car batteries (incl. long range)

## Looking Ahead: Global Coordination Pivotal [CIA lead]

- -Examines possible unintended consequences
- -Identifies opportunities for global cooperation
- -Examines role of continued government support

#### **TEXTBOXES**

- 1) Critical Metals in Short Supply (incl. rare earths, lithium, cobalt) [South Africa lead]
- 2) CCS: A Realistic Promise? [CIA lead]
- Geopolitics of Renewable Energy [UK lead]
- 4) Electricity Is The Key Driver for Renewables, Economic Growth [CIA lead]
- 5) Intelligence Requirements, Collection Gaps on Renewables [Joint]

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, ZAF, UK, AUS

I would like to seek your assistance and update you on plans by the CIA climate change center to lead a joint effort with the UK, South Africa, and Australia intelligence services. This effort is intended to provide CIA with a deeper understanding of the potential for ramping up renewable and clean energy in key parts of the world and a better understanding of the collection capabilities and interests on renewables in the UK, South Africa, and Australia.

To move forward from this point, can you please seek final approval from your country's respective intelligence services to go ahead with the project, with the understanding by them that, altogether, four intelligence services will be involved with the project. Also, assuming they offer a final go-ahead, provide each service with the draft outline of the paper (attached above), seeking their suggestions/changes/concurrence. This is a draft outline and if any of the participants want to focus on additional issue areas, that would of course be welcomed.

I have marked 'South Africa lead' on the sections of the paper that I believe are most pertinent to South Africa related issues.

Thus, everything looks great re: the overall project—we hope that and his staff will agree to write the relevant sections, and they are of course welcomed to add to other sections or revise the outline if need be. All in all I suspect it will take one or two months for all sides to write their parts—but I will follow up with a rough schedule later, once all parties are agreed. The issue area of 'renewables' have become even more strategic in the last several weeks, as the UK, Germany, and now the US have established long-term energy strategies requiring 80% dependence on renewable and clean energy by the 2035-2050 period. At this early stage we have already identified numerous challenges and potential problems with such ambitious targets—but our joint paper will certainly be well-timed.





#### RUSSIAN FEDERATION FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE (FSB)

#### CONFIDENTIAL / RELEASABLE TO THE R.S.A. SIDE (SASS) ONLY

Ref. No. 825-2

\_\_ February 2011

#### SUBJECT: "Al-Qaida in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb"; Current Operational Profile

The following information was obtained in the course of the operational activities conducted by Russia's FSB against the "Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM).

Currently, the leaders of the core "Al-Qaida" are trying to enlarge the scope of their influence by way of using the combat capability of the AQIM which has been posing ever increasing threat to the security of North African and Western European countries as well as to the entire African Continent.

It is commonly believed that the AQIM started to expand its activity upon Mali in 1996; during that year Mokhtar Belmokhtar (currently known as a leader of the AQIM's subsidiary group "Al-Mulatamun") settled down on the Malian territory in the area located between Arekchecheh, Tessalit and Boudjebeha in order to conduct smuggling operations from there.

Over the period of time from 1996 to 2004 the group of Belmokhtar had developed certain subversive capability including the logistical support base near Tigharghar in the northwestern part of Mali. The strength of the group grew considerably after the indigenous Tuareg people had started joining its ranks.

Members of the "Al-Qaida" commenced the active infiltration into Mali after the antiterrorist campaign had started in Afghanistan in 2001. Initially the Malian north was selected as the "emergency landing ground" for the "Al-Qaida".

The strategic objectives of the AQIM (currently headed by Abdelmalek Droukdal, a.k.a. "Abou Moussab Abdel Wadoud") are the dissemination of the global jihadist ideology, consolidation of different extremist groups under the slogans of struggle against the United States and their Western European allies, forcible takeover of power and establishment of theocratic states governed by the Sharia' laws to be subsequently comprised within the so-called "Great Caliphate".

In February 2010 Droukdal stated his readiness to support the appeal of the senior leader of the "Al-Qaida" Ayman Al-Zawahiri to stir-up the militant jihad campaign, literally, "to sanitize Maghreb by way of cleaning it of Spanish and French infidels and eventually transfer the battle to the Iberian Peninsula". He specially stressed, that the AQIM will become "a hard bite on which crusaders and renegades would choke" as a result of increasing the scope of subversive activities in Spain, Italy, France, Britain and Germany, and also in Africa, that is Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Somalia and Kenya.

Within the nearest future terrorists will be focusing their main efforts on undermining the economic infrastructure of African countries and foreign companies, including critical pipeline networks, petrochemical and mining industries, R&D institutions and life support systems. Leaders of the AQIM proceed from the presumption that terrorist attacks and acts

of sabotage would inevitably bring about chaos into the everyday life of the society, diminishing the volumes of the investments in the economic development of North Africa by world's leading powers and growing public distrust in the government eventually provoking the change of the regime.

At present armed formations of the AQIM are structurally comprised within the "northern" and "southern" operational sectors. The "northern sector" encompasses Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, where the majority of terrorism-related incidents occur. On the territories of these countries extremists have set up a network of clandestine workshops for the production of remotely-operated IEDs. To proceed with the "mine warfare" against governmental institutions and security forces small groups of experienced saboteurs (5 to 9-man strong), including those who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, are formed.

Prospective plans of the AQIM leadership presume expanding the scope of operational activity at the expense of perpetrating terrorist attacks within the Mediterranean maritime domain. To meet this goal the so-called "Marine Unit" (ca. 60-man strong) was established; it comprises suicide operatives trained in different underwater sabotage techniques (such as planting improvised limpet mines under the hull of a ship) and use of small vessels (schooners) or fast crafts as strike-weapons ("floating bombs") against seaborne targets.

The AQIM is also reported to be seeking ways of developing its own biological weapons to be used for terrorist purposes. According to intelligence reports the laboratory works to that effect had been conducted at a base located in eastern Algeria. Terrorists tried to isolate the pathogenic culture of pneumonic plague (Yersinia pestis). However in 2009, after the contamination and death of around 40 militants caused by the improper hermetic conditions at the laboratory, the base was abandoned.

The "southern sector" of the AQIM encompasses remote areas of the Sahara desert (in the south of Algeria) as well as the northern parts of Niger, Mali and Mauritania, where Islamists have been closely collaborating with the armed groups of Tuareg separatists (making bids for the proclaiming of the independent state of Azawad with a prospect of secession from Mali). The AQIM's modus operandi within the "southern sector" includes the redeployment of militants, transfer of illegal migrants, smuggling in arms, ammunition and narcotic drugs, as well as the kidnapping and forcible retention of hostages who in some instances could be executed.

In order to find alternative sources of financing the AQIM maintains contacts with criminal associations. Being inspired by the Afghan terrorists' experience of profiting from heroin trade, Islamists established links with the drug cartels smuggling cocaine from Latin America into West Africa and widely using maritime transportation routes and unregistered private aircraft for that purpose. Through the AQIM's facilitation the drugs of Latin American origin are illegally transported to Western Europe and the United States via the territories of Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Morocco. According to expert assessments currently around 60 percent of cocaine supplies are transited to Europe via West Africa. Even so, the AQIM is making attempts to increase its interest in the profits from drugtrafficking. Extremists have also been gaining proceeds from other types of crime, such as robberies, racketeering, car thefts, burglaries, carding schemes etc.

Recruitment is an integral part of the AQIM strategy. The selection of candidate recruits, including potential suicide operatives, conducted in both Western Europe and Africa, is followed by the training of freshly-recruited militants and their subsequent redeployment to different areas of ongoing jihadist campaigns (Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan). The AQIM recruiters have been purposefully spotting their potential targets among the global jihad sympathizers within the Muslim communities of Europe.

The growing number of socio-economic grievances in the majority of African countries is seen as a facilitating factor in the context of the AQIM's recruitment efforts. Apart from ideology candidate recruits are often driven by monetary incentives. Since recently the AQIM recruiters have been considering the population of the Sahara / Sahel zone (above all Mauritania, Mali and Niger) to be their primary "target group". In particular, Mauritanians form the mainstay of the "southern sector". The prison population has also been in the focus of recruiters' attention. In this case the recruitment process takes considerably shorter time, given the typical state of morale and psychological conditions of inmates, who by the time of their release could become highly-motivated "readymade" terrorists.

In general, there is a steady trend of the AQIM transformation into the center of gravity for radicals of Islamist, separatist and criminal orientations who have the ambition to expand their influence far beyond the African Continent. It is expected that the AQIM will be trying to consolidate under its organizational umbrella all extremist outfits operating within an enormous territory of land stretching from Morocco and Guinea in the west to Sudan and Somalia in the east. The apparent inability of some African leaders to impose stricter control of the situation in their countries could be exploited to the benefits of the AQIM; in practical terms this could be done by way of setting up militant recruitment centers and training camps, stockpiling weapons and munitions, or otherwise, establishing channels of arms smuggling and drug-trafficking.

Given the sum of the above facts, we express interest in the joint operational targeting of the African-based international terrorist groups and organizations, as well as in the obtaining of any information that could possibly link them to the bandit militants still active in the North Caucasus.

Thank you for your cooperation.

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DAY ONE:

## DRAFT REPORT OF MEETING HELD

IN ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

DOMESTIC LIAISON

2012 - 10- 31

TIME 09 40 SIGN ASS. S.A.S.S.

#### **ON 24 OCTOBER 2012**

#### **PURPOSE**

The multi-disciplinary team headed by Director: Mr S NTOMBELA SSA:FB) consisted of General DLADLA (SAPS), Colonel (Special Forces); Lt-Colonel,

FB and Mr M APHANE

(DIRCO). The team left South Africa for Addis Ababa on 24-10-2012 in order to engage with the Security Establishment of Ethiopia on security matters related to concerns around the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), Dr NC DLAMINI-ZUMA.

The following meetings were scheduled by the Head of Station;

- Meeting Ambassador PEPANI
- Meeting with National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS)
- Meeting with Head of AUC Safety and Security Division (AUC SSD)

Meeting on arrival 24 Oct 2012

On arrival the team convened a meeting with Acting Director Mr NTOMBELA, outlining the purpose of the visit. He mentioned that the visit was aimed at meeting the local state security apparatus to discuss all security related issues around the Chairperson of the AUC. This was also aimed at making an overall intervention for the security of the AUC Chair and this also included getting the assurances from the host country service

The Acting Director then requested to make remarks on the purpose of the visit. It is made to ask the question of security around the AUC Chairperson in a manner that is not intrusive but asked in good faith. Furthermore, the General said the team needed to unbundle the issues as they are raising them with the Host Service so as to avoid creating an impression that South Africa was declaring a vote of no confidence on the handling of AUC Chairperson's security.

also thought that it would be necessary to reflect on the issue of last year that was involving his department and the arrest of DMI officer by the Ethiopians. According to him, the Host Service did not want to meet with him during his visit despite the fact that they had shown willingness and commitment to do so.

The Acting Director concurred with the sentiments raised by aspect of managing the issues and the sensitivities that comes with issue of the obligation the Host country to protect all AU and member states in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The Acting Director further pointed out that the issue at hand was about to receiving briefing and update on how they are proceeding about the issue of an unnamed state alleged to be seeking to course harm to the Chairperson on 24 October 2012. He also intimated that this issue was then followed by another alert which further pointed out a potential assassination plot that was allegedly hatched to be carried out at a different venue that it been planned earlier.

The Team adopted the following approach to engaging the Ethiopians:

The team agreed that the correct approach to engage the Ethiopians would be to say that South Africa is pleased with manner in which they have provided and elevated security arrangements around the Chairperson despite the fact that the alert provided to them does not add up in some respect.

#### The expected outcome:

- To develop a security capacity to deal with security challenges as well as to render security service capacity as and when the travels around the continent
- To establish a multi-disciplinary coordinating structure that is not intrusive but that would be perform specific functions for the protection of the AUC Chairperson
- · To ensure that the work of the task team is coordinated through NICOC or cluster

#### Recommendations

- That the VIP protection team capacity be increased from one Officer to a of several
  officers to be constituted by SAPS and would perform duties on a rotational basis.
- Special Forces to explore ways of strengthening security capacity to cover travels of the Chairperson when she visits hot spot in the continent
- To create a Nodal-point in the Office of the Chairperson to facilitate the flow of information between her office and the Nodal point.
- As a means of ensuring an inclusive nature of the security of the Chair, SADC needs to be influence to participate in proving security to the AUC Chairperson

- The task team would also want to prioritise on building relations with NISS as the latter is the primary provider of security to the Chairperson
- support the idea of utilising the medical capability of the Cubans medical contingent currently stationed in Ethiopia

DAY TWO:

#### DRAFT REPORT OF MEETING WITH

#### THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF

#### NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES

IN ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

**ON 25 OCTOBER 2012** 

| The South African delegation to the above -mentioned meeting was | led by | Director S. M. |
|--|--------|----------------|
| NTOMBELA composed of the following members:                      |        |                |
| Colonel MOLEFE (Attache) and Messrs M. APHANE:                   | and    |                |

The Delegation was warmly welcomed by the Director of Foreign Service of NISS Mr. Hadera ABERA and (Head of Liaison). He congratulated South Africa for the election of the new Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) Director NTOMBELA thanked the Director of Foreign Service for the warm welcome to him and his delegation. He then indicate the purpose of the visit to Addis Ababa firstly to expressed the gratitude for the manner in which NISS has handled the issue of security of the African Union Commission Chairperson as well as the speedy responds to the request forwarded from SSA to NISS. He further expressed condolences on passing away of the beloved leader, Prime Minister Meles ZENAWI.

The Director of NISS Foreign Service pointed out that he had received the request from SSA FB with names of the person who pose a potential threat to the Chairperson of the AUC. In this regard, gave a brief that upon receipt the Service auctioned the operation to check the names from all entry points especially those bordering Sudan; airports through immigration. He further pointed-out that their investigation could not establish the existence of the names provided. He requested that the information be beefed-up in terms of the details on specifics of the individuals involved. Furthermore he reiterated the point that NISS would do everything possible to ensure the safety of the Chairperson of the AU. He emphasised the


point that there has been never a threat that developed into a situation where a diplomat is killed in Addis Ababa with exception of the former Egyptian President MUBARAK whose life was threatened in 1987. However he pointed out that NISS has foiled a number of terrorist activities aimed at Ethiopia. In this regard he requested there be a process of sharing intelligence on continuous basis between the two Services. He further indicated that NISS had had good working relations with the South African Secret Service under the former Director-General Mr T. DENIS and that this could form the basis of close cooperation between the two Services. He also made reference to the agreement between the two Services regarding the drafting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

The Acting Director of SSA FB responded by pointing out that the two countries occupy strategic location in the continent and that their respective governments had cooperated on numerous issues. He also intimated that the SSA was looking forward to future cooperation between the two Services on matters of Security, information sharing, assistance to issues that cannot be handled by one service such as Terrorism, Cyber threats especially those that could be directed to the African Union.

The Director SSA requested a briefing on the security assessment of the region as well as the one of the African Union. He further enquired for an indication on the security of the Chairperson when she travels around the continent to hot-spot areas in particular. The Director NISS Foreign Service pointed out that he would not have the details on the assessment due to the short notice to which the meeting arranged. However he would consult with different branches of NISS especially the one dealing with VVIP Protection.

He committed that the assessment could be covered within the context of issues that would be contained in the MoU. However he would arrange an exchange meeting of experts to discuss the regional security situation and that of the security of AU. In his response he pointed out that the VVIP Service does not belong to his portfolio but to that of Security. He then briefed the delegation on how NISS is structured:





The Director NISS request the Director SSA-FB to share the details of the threat against the AUC Chairperson as they did not pick anything from their side but would like to find out the background to the threat. This would enable NISS to have a better assessment of the threat. He also requested SSA to share any threat that may be picked-up against or directed against AU and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as the issues of terrorism aare not confined within the borders of FDRE. The Director SSA-FB responded by outlining the following types of threats that could impinge the success of the AU Chairperson in her work:

- Threats that could arise from those who oppose the principles of the AU Constitutive
   Act the coup plotters and those involved in unconstitutional change of governments;
- Those who may not want the Chairperson to visit the hot-spot like Somalia and Mali to address the issues pertaining to peace and stability;
- Threat from the emanating from extremist groups like Alshabaab directed at the AU as vulnerable target
- Threat emanating from forces outside the continent who may not wanting to stall implementation of the AUC programmes
- The Acting Director pointed out that there was no specific threat other than the reported potential threat reported against the life of the AUC Chairperson

further expressed the sentiments of the Director SSA-FB by expressing South Africa's gratitude for the manner NISS in which the security of the AUC Chairperson and the feed-back on the request pertaining the threat. He emphasised the need to liaise at an expert level between the two Services on matters of cyber threat against the AU.

The Director SSA FB requested the facilitation by NISS Director with VIP Security department of NISS so that he can express the same gratitude on the protection of the AUC Chairperson. He further asked if NISS could facilitate the licensing of the additional number of fire-arms for the VIP protection. The NISS Director responded by indicating that he would facilitate the experts meeting with the department of Security to engage on the details.

The Director SSA-FB concluded by extending a wish to meet the Director-General NISS either by the Acting Director-General; himself or both of them as soon as it that meeting could possibly take place.

General Egziabher MEBRAHTU's briefing was in line with issues that were covered by SSA delegation led by Refer to paragraphs below:

Daily update on the State Security Agency (SSA) task team visit to the Headquarters of the African Union Commission (AUC) 10 October 2012

- 1. Introduction
- 1.1 Following the engagements of 09 October 2012, the SSA Task Team proceeded with its programme on 10 October 2012. This programme entailed the following:
  - Courtesy call on the South African Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Permanent Representative of South Africa to the African Union, General LC PEPANI.
  - Meeting with the Head of AUC Security and Safety Division (SSD), General Egziabher MEBRAHTU, Deputy Head of SSD. Colonel Sadeeg Garba SHEHU and the SSD Operations Officer
  - Meeting with the AUC Facilities Manager, Dr Auguste NGOMO.
- Courtesy call on the South African Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Permanent Representative of South Africa to the African Union, General LC PEPANI
- 2.1 During the courtesy call the following points were raised by the Ambassador:
  - Since the July Summit of the AU which elected Dr DLAMINI-ZUMA as the AUC Chairperson, a number of countries that had opposed the latter's election had changed their attitude and expressed willingness to cooperate with the South African Embassy.
  - Significant developments in this regard took place, chief amongst which was
    the re-call of the previous French Ambassador<sup>1</sup>, Mr Jean-Christophe
    BELLIARD and his replacement by Madame Brigitte COLLET. In addition,
    the United States (US) Embassy in Addis Ababa had also indicated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> He had tirelessly campaigned against the candidature of Dr DLAMINI ZUMA

willingness to facilitate a meeting between Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham CLINTON and the newly elected AUC Chairperson Dr DLAMINI-ZUMA. In this regard the Ambassador also recalled that the US, through its Embassy in Addis Ababa, had also played a significant behind the scenes role in campaigning against Dr DLAMINI-ZUMA. Furthermore, the majority of African countries who had campaigned against SADC candidates are beginning to express willingness to co-operate with the newly-elected Chairperson. Countries like Nigeria, Kenya and others have indicated readiness to turn a new leaf for the sake of the African continent.

- On the other hand, developments in the host country including the unfortunate and untimely demise of former Prime Minister Meles ZENAWI have presented an opportunity for both RSA and Ethiopia to repair the damaged relations between the two countries. However, the Ambassador also emphasised the tenuous internal situation in the host country mainly characterised by ongoing tensions between the ruling minority Tigrayans² and the rest of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). These tensions have recently been exacerbated by what appears to be the tightening of the grip on power by the Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF) which is the dominant partner in the EPRDF.
- Nonetheless, developments in the host country point towards the emergence
  of possibilities for a substantive turn around in RSA-Ethiopia relations
  including the forging of business ventures and an opportunity for both
  countries to learn from each other's experiences<sup>3</sup>
- With regard to the request of the task team to conduct an inspection at the official residence of the Chairperson, Ambassador PEPANI gave members of the task team an explanation of some of the difficulties the Embassy had experienced in accessing that site. It was only after prolonged persistence that a delegation from the Embassy, DIRCO, AU and the Station led by the Ambassador was finally given permission by Dr Jean PING to visit the official residence on 05 October 2012<sup>4</sup>.
- Ambassador promised to share with the SSA task team a copy of the inspection visit to the official residence.
- In conclusion, the leader of the task team thanked the Ambassador for the opportunity to make a courtesy call to on the Ambassador and expressed a desire to work closely with the Embassy and the station in ensuring that Dr DLAMINI-ZUMA's tenure at the helm of the AUC was a productive one in furtherance of the objective of securing peace security and sustainable development for the people of Africa

#### 3. Meeting with the Head of AUC SSD

<sup>2</sup> Since the death of former Prime Minister ZENAWI, thirty seven (37) new Generals from the Defence Force have been promoted, thirty four (34) of which are Tigrayans.

Refer to task team report of 09/10/2012 for full details.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Ambassador stated his disappointment with regard to the recent developments at South African Airways (SAA) and pointed to how RSA could tap into the vast experience of Ethiopian Airlines in addressing issues of turnaround strategies and general management of airlines.

After the courtesy call on the Ambassador the team and the Head of Station (HOS) proceeded to the a meeting with the Head of the SSD General Egziabher MEBRAHTU who was joined by his deputy and Nigerian national Colonel Sadeeq Garba SHEHU and SSD Operations Officer Mr Christopher S KAYOSHE from Rwanda.

In his introductory remarks the HOS thanked the Head of SSD for the opportunity to meet and introduced members of the SSA Task Team He further elaborated that the meeting was a follow up on earlier engagement with the Head of SSD. During the meeting the following points were raised:

- The international security environment; the situation on the African continent and the Horn of Africa in particular had changed thereby meriting a reassessment of the threats facing the AU. In this regard, the increased involvement in conflict resolution especially in areas like Somalia, Mali and others increase the prospects of attacks on AU personnel and property. Coupled to the above, recognition had to be made of the fact that in the past eighteen (18) months the size of AU personnel had quadrupled.
- It was also felt that the increase in the number of meetings and events hosted by the AU and Ethiopia compounds the security threats and risks.
- The Head of SSD gave the SSA delegation a brief on the personal security deployments level around the Chairperson of the AUC in line with what was mentioned in the report of SSA Task Team dated 09/10/2012.
- He lamented the absence of an approved security policy and standard operating procedures and the fact that their past attempts to access senior AUC management had yielded no tangible results. He then expressed a feeling that the finalisation of the existing draft policy should be one of the first priorities of the incoming Chairperson. Furthermore, the Head of the SSD was of the view that the creation of a Security Advisory Board residing in the office of the Chairperson was of paramount importance.
- General MEBRAHTU also reiterated the need for RSA assistance in capacity building; enhancement in safety and security and the development of security systems and standards in line with international best practice.
- He further lamented the lack of requisite attention to security by senior management of the AUC and gave the example of the cumbersome chain of command.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, it would be in the best interests of the AU, AUC and in securing the safety of personnel and property for the line of command to be streamlined such that security reports directly to the AUC Chairperson.
  - The meeting concluded by an agreement that any further engagement between the AUC Security and RSA in relation to training should take place within the context of all AU protocols including Host Country Agreement.
- All pertinent issues raised by the Head of SSD and his delegation should be duly packaged and presented directly to the incoming Chairperson in a meeting to be facilitated by the HoS.
- The SSD made a promise that he and his staff will provide an efficient service, to protect and support the incoming Chairperson of the AUC.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Currently, the Head of SSD reports to the Head of administration who In turn reports to the Director of Administration who reports to the Commissioner of Human Resource, who reports to the Deputy Chairperson of the AUC



#### 4. Meeting with the AUC Facilities Manager

This meeting discussed the following:

- Mr NGOMO ascertained it would take a period of two months to complete the
  refurbishment and the purchasing of furniture for the official residence. He also
  added that there are three companies from Spain, RSA and the USA that were
  short-listed for the installation of the electronic security systems for the Office
  and the Official Residence.
- The current official vehicle of the Chairperson is five years old.
- The AU is guided by the European Union (EU) blacklisting framework in selecting airlines to be used by the Chairperson. The AUC Chairperson uses the following commercial airlines: Lufthansa, European and other Star Alliance airlines including South African Airways. She would travel first or business class depending on availability.
- The Chairperson's entourage ordinarily travels economy class except in cases where the trip is longer than eight (8) hours.
- Mr NGOMO further elaborated the following additional travel arrangements in respect of the additional VIP protector from RSA:
  - the AUC would cover the initial travel costs from RSA and on subsequent trips when travelling with the Principal. In such a case the AUC would also cover the subsistence allowance, travel and accommodation costs.
  - o In cases where the accommodation costs exceed the AUC norms, the VIP protected would be required to pay the costs and claim the difference arising therefrom upon return.
- He also shared with the delegation concerns regarding the recent transfers against the letter and spirit of declared staff transfers and appointments. This has led to a situation where tension, anxiety and uncertainties among senior staff are rife. The team asserts that these developments hold the potential of heightening tensions and suspicions particularly in relation to perceived post-PING movement of senior staff as already elaborated in the SSA POA and IP dated 07/10/2012 (section dealing with assumptions and principles).

#### CONTINUATIONOF THE MEETING ON 25 OCTOBER 2012.

AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY

Upon arrival of the Chairperson to Ethiopia, the host country of the AUC, security was provided by NISS against the background that were raised which are poor capacity to provide and protect.

AUC security is unarmed

General Egziabher MEBRAHTU lamented on the challenges.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> A case in point is the proposed transfer of Dr Abdul-Hakim ELWAER the Director of Human Resource and Administration to Human resources Science & Technology

Whilst NISS provided security for the AUC Chairperson, AU did not arrange accommodation and resources for food.

General Egziabher MEBRAHTU also mentioned that the protectors slept in corridors for four days without food and water provided.

The current situation is that they are provided with accommodation without food and water. This creates a gap since they have to go out of the hotel to get food and water, leaving the Chairperson unattended, therefore vulnerable.

To this effect a decision was taken at the meeting that on her return from South Africa the accommodation and food costs will be factored as part of the AUC Chairperson's account.

This has been done to avoid creation of a perception that South Africa is taking over the provision of the protection of the Chairperson from NISS and AUC.

#### SECURITY

It was agreed in the meeting that SAPS will avail resources and advance team.

AUC Head of Security would avail buy-in and programme of the Chairperson when she visits hot spot areas.

There was also a decision that moving forward there must be a clear division of responsibilities to all role players. (SSA, SAPS, MILITARY)

A decision was taken that issues relating to VIP Protection will be dealt with by SAPS, that is including:


- Fire arm licensing for additional security personal including future co-operation with NISS and SSD.
- SAPS would provide cover for State Security to access AUC building and official residence to execute its CI and TSCM functions.



EMPOPIA.

#### SECRET





2012 October 29

Development Since the Alert on the Possible Assassination of the Chairperson of the African Union Chairperson (AUC)

#### 1. Introduction

The alert was received by the Station on the 22 October 2012. Following the consultation with the Deputy Head of Station, the Head of Station informed the Head of Mission (HoM) on the possible developments. A request to increase the security of the Chairperson of the AUC was also requested to the Security Department of the National Intelligence and Security Service of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE).

#### 2. The Basis of Informing the HoM

In FDRE there are two 'Safe Havens' to which South Africans can be taken to in the event of any emergency situation that would require evacuation as a result of threat to lives of the individuals. These are

Upon receiving the alert which indicated that the assassins were in Addis Ababa from the 12 October 2012 to carry-out the assignment on the 24 October 2012, it was felt that the assassins could carry-out the assignment at anytime in the interim period to the 24 October depending on when the opportunity prevails for them. The 23 October 2012 was observed as a critical day for the operation hence the HoM would have to put in place the necessary conditions for the environment to receive the Chaiperson of the AUC at the official residence.

The analysis of the information at hand was that the executors of the assignment may have been ahead in planning the operation. The available time would also not allow the Host Service an opportunity to neutralise the operation. This required alternative arrangements to be in place for any eventuality.

#### 3. Liaison of the Request with NISS

The Head of NISS Security Division responsible for the safety and security of the VVIP in FDRE was requested to increase the security of the Chairperson as there was an eminent threat to her. This was done telephonically. The Head of NISS Security Division responded positively and promptly increased the security of the Chairperson of the AUC.

#### 4. Liaison of the Information with NISS

On the 23 October 2012, an instruction was received to the effect that the Station should liaise with the Host Service the names of the assassins and request that prompt action be undertaken to neutralise the assignment with the possibility of arresting the assassins. The information was discussed with the Head of Liaison of NISS at about 17H00.

On the 25 the Acting Director of State Security Agency: Foreign Branch (SSA:FB) received a feedback from the Head of the Foreign Service of NISS to the effect that:

- The names were searched and it has been found that no such names could be linked with individuals in the Republic of Sudan (RoS);
- He also indicated that in their assessment the RoS would not carry-out such
  operations in FDRE as RoS paid dearly in the attempted assassination of Egypt
  former President MUBARAK;
- All ports of entry were checked as well as the border areas between FDRE and RoS and there was no record of suspected RoS nationals entering FDRE.

However, the threat is handled with utmost seriousness and follow-up is being done to clear all potential possibilities on the potential assassination of the Chairperson of the AUC.

#### 5. Conclusion

The Station is following-up with NISS on the development on whether any new information has been found. So far no new information has been received regarding the assassins. The developments on the situation will be monitored and a close liaison with NISS on the matter will be carried-out on daily basis.

SECRET 2

SASS/T51/CI/CE/PL

MAY 2005

### SOUTH AFRICAN SECRET SERVICE



# COUNTER-ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS POLICY & PROCEDURAL MANUAL

## ALIAZEERA

ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECRET SERVICE IN TERMS OF SECTION 10(3) OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ACT, 2002 (ACT 65 OF 2002)

### PART A: COUNTER-ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS POLICY

| INDEX |                        | PAGE |
|-------|------------------------|------|
| 1.    | POLICY OBJECTIVES      | 4    |
| 2.    | DEFINITIONS            | 4    |
| 3.    | FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES | 4    |

## ALJAZEERA

3

## PART B: PROCEDURAL MANUAL:

INDEX

4 AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT CE INVESTIGATIONS

6

## ALJAZEERA

PART A

#### COUNTER ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS POLICY

#### POLICY OBJECTIVE

1.1 To provide guidelines for the authorization, conduct and review of Counter-Espionage investigations.

#### 2. DEFINITIONS

- 2.1 **ESPIONAGE:** Activities conducted for the purpose of acquiring by unlawful or unauthorized means, information or assets relating to sensitive social, political, economic, scientific or military matters of the Republic of South Africa, or for the purpose of their unauthorized communication to a foreign state, foreign political organization or hostile intelligence organization.
- 2.2 **LEVEL ONE INVESTIGATIONS:** This relates to the employment of overt investigative techniques such as but not limited to the following
  - · Openly interviewing of persons,
  - · Conducting research on open information, and
  - Perusing SASS' archives.
- 2.3 **LEVEL TWO COUNTER ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS:** This relates to the employment of covert investigative techniques such as but not limited to the following
  - The tasking of secret sources,
  - The use of physical, signal and/or technical surveillance measures; or
  - · Interception of communication.

#### 3. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

- 3.1 The purpose of a level two Counter Espionage investigation shall be to prove or refute suspected cases of espionage in order to neutralise threats emanating there-from.
- 3.2 Only the Division Counter Espionage Investigation shall conduct level two Counter Espionage investigations.
- 3.3 The SSHE Committee authorises and reviews the conduct of level two Counter Espionage investigations. In exceptional cases, the Director-General may authorise a level two Counter Espionage investigation.
- 3.4 The SSHE Committee shall authorise the transfer of dossiers to the South African Police Services (SAPS) or the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) for neutralization purposes.

5

3.5 The subject of a level two Counter Espionage investigation must at no stage prior to the finalisation of the investigation know of the investigation being conducted against him/her.



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#### PART B

#### PROCEDURAL MANUAL

|    |               |         | Company of the Compan |           |                  |   |
|----|---------------|---------|--|-----------|------------------|---|
| A  | ALITHODITY TO | CONDUCT | COLINTED   | ECDIONIAC | E INVECTION TION | C |
| 4. | AUINURIII IU  | CUNDUCI | COUNTER  | COLIGINAG | E INVESTIGATION  | J |

#### 4.1 LEVEL ONE INVESTIGATIONS

- 4.1.1 All members of SASS shall report suspicious observations, breaches or potential security breaches to a Counter Intelligence Officer in his/her own Chief Directorate.
- 4.1.2 A Counter Intelligence Officer who receives a report from a member or who witnesses such suspicious observations, breaches or potential breaches of security shall conduct a level one investigation within his/her own area of work.
- 4.1.3 Every Counter Intelligence Officer who conducts a level one investigation shall report his/her findings to his/her Divisional Head who shall thereafter report to the relevant security Manager. A copy of the report shall also be given to the relevant security Analyst.
- 4.2 LEVEL TWO CE INVESTIGATIONS

#### 4.2.1 INITIATION

4.2.1.1 Level two Counter Espionage investigations may be initiated by different structures by applying to the SSHE Committee on a prescribed form attached hereto and marked annexure A.

#### 4.2.2 AUTHORIZATION

4.2.2.1 In the application referred to in paragraph 4.2.1.1 above, the Counter Intelligence officer and his/her Divisional Head and the relevant Manager shall motivate the need for a level two Counter Espionage investigation.

#### 4.2.3 REVIEW

- 4.2.3.1 If approved, the level two Counter Espionage investigations shall be authorised for a period not exceeding twelve (12) months.
- 4.2.3.2 The Counter Espionage Investigation Unit shall report on the progress of the investigation to the SSHE Committee quarterly.

#### 4.2.4 TERMINATION

4.2.4.1 The SSHE Committee may at any time before the finalisation of an investigation, withdraw its authorisation for the Counter Espionage investigation and order the termination of the investigation.

#### 4.2.5 DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

7

4.2.5.1 The Counter Espionage Investigation Unit shall at the end of every investigation report in writing to the SSHE Committee the outcome of the Counter Espionage investigation and advise the SSHE Committee of the extent of the damages.

#### 4.2.6 HANDING OVER

4.2.6.1 Where appropriate the SSHE Committee will authorise the handover of a dossier to SAPS or NIA.

APPROVED:

DIRECTOR-GENERAL SOUTH AFRICAN SECRET SERVICE MAY 2005

## ALJAZEERA

ANNEXURE A



(Applicant's Reference)

(Applicant's designated CD) e.g. Office of the Manager Corporate Security

Date of the Application

The Safety Security Health & Environment Committee

for attention

## APPLICATION FOR THE INSTITUTION OF A LEVEL 2 COUNTER ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATION

| 1 |
|---|
|   |
|   |
|   |
|   |

4. Nature of the possible offence:

|                         | 9  |
|-------------------------|--|
| 5.                      | What is the envisaged outcome of the investigation                                 |
|                         |  |
| 6.                      | Is it possible to obtain the required result without the use of covert techniques? |
| 6.1.                    | If not, state why not:   |
|                         |  |
|                         |  |
|                         |  |
|                         |  |
|                         |  |
|                         |  |
| 7.                      |  |
| 1.                      | What is the expected duration of the investigation?                                |
|                         |  |
|                         | What is the expected duration of the investigation?  ure of the Applicant          |
| Signati                 | ure of the Applicant   |
| Signati                 |  |
| <u>Signato</u>          | ure of the Applicant   |
| <u>Signato</u>          | ure of the Applicant nmended / Not Recommended                                     |
| Signato Recom           | ure of the Applicant nmended / Not Recommended                                     |
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| Signato Recom           | nmended / Not Recommended  onal Head  nmended / Not Recommended                    |

H.A. DENNIS
DIRECTOR GENERAL

ALJAZEERA

SECRET



DOMESTIC LIAISON

20:2 -10- 2 6

TIME 09:40 SIGN F-S.A.S.S.

### LIAISON CONTACT REPORT

| Liaison Contact         | L670  |       |  |
|-------------------------|---|-------|--|
| SASS Member/s Involved  | Head of Station                             |       |  |
| Unit                    | NF22/2                                      |       |  |
| Date of Contact         | 22 October 2012                             |       |  |
| Place of Contact        | Sheraton Hotel                              |       |  |
| FIS Member/s            | NISS Head of Security NISS Head of Security |       |  |
| FIS Members Positions   |   |       |  |
| Type of Contact         | Operational                                 |       |  |
|                         | Social                                      | X     |  |
|                         | Telephonic                                  |       |  |
|                         | Other (Specify)                             |       |  |
| SSA Requested Contact   | Yes:  | No: V |  |
| Documents: a. Requested | None  | No: X |  |
| b. Exchanged            | None  | 1     |  |

#### 1. Background

The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Head of Security has been providing the protection service to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) since her arrival on the 13 October 2012. The NISS Head of Security requested a meeting with the Head of Station regarding the protection service to the Chairperson of the AUC.

## 2. The Discussion on Protection Service and Personal Safety

#### a. The Chairperson of the AUC

The NISS Head of Security indicated that the security personnel of the AUC has voiced its displeasure to the current situation where the Chairperson personal protection is rendered by NISS. It is therefore in the opinion of NISS that the matter should be addressed by the Commission and make a determination on whether the service by NISS should continue or be terminated. The concern of NISS is that the Chairperson is still residing in a public place, the Sheraton Hotel and that requires professional protection service which the Safety and Security Division of the AUC lacks. The NISS Head of Security pointed out that the service was provided because of the request from the Head of Station during the discussions on the environment in the region.

On this matter the Head of Station requested that the protection team that is with the Chairperson of the AUC be kept in place and not be withdrawn until consultation is carried out with the Chairperson through the Ambassador of South Africa to the African Union (AU).

## b. The African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP)

The NISS Head of Security indicated that the issue of theRepublics of Sudan (RoS) and South Sudan (RSS) is becoming sensitive in the both countries. In this regard he raised the NISS security concern on the Chairperson of the AUHIP whilst in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) to facilitate resolution of the outstanding issues between the RoS

and RSS. He then requested that the Head of Station provides all times the following information:

- i. Chairperson of the AUHIP arrival and departure schedules;
- ii. Size of the entourage;
- iii. Meetings and the people he will be meeting;
- iv. Time and place of the meetings; and
- v. In addition NISS would want to provide armed protection for the Chairperson of the AUHIP

#### 3. Conclusion

The NISS Head of Security did not provide elaborate explanation of the beef-up on the security and protection of the Chairpersons of AUC and AUHIP except to indicate that AU is a target of Al-Shabaab and there is vulnerability of recruitment of the AU personnel by Al-Shabaab.

On the latter Chairperson the indication was on the sensitivity of the stage of the issues that the AUHIP is facilitating.

The Station requests approval on the responsibilities that it will have to undertake with regard to the matters raised.

4. Thank you.



EMOPIA.

SECRET



### **State Security**

State Security Agency
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

#### LIAISON CONTACT REPORT

DOMESTIC LIAISON

2012 -10- 2 6

TIME: 09: 40 SIGN. S.A.S.S.

| Liaison Contact         | L670                 |       |  |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-------|--|
| SASS Member/s Involved  | Head of Station      |       |  |
| Unit                    | NF22/2               |       |  |
| Date of Contact         | 22 October 2012      |       |  |
| Place of Contact        | Sheraton Hotel       |       |  |
| FIS Member/s            | NISS Head of Liaison |       |  |
| FIS Members Positions   | NISS Head of Liaison |       |  |
| Type of Contact         | Operational          | X     |  |
|                         | Social               |       |  |
|                         | Telephonic           |       |  |
|                         | Other (Specify)      |       |  |
| SSA Requested Contact   | Yes:                 | No: X |  |
| Documents: a. Requested | None                 |       |  |
| b. Exchanged            | None                 |       |  |

#### 1. Background

The Director-General of the State Security Agency (SSA) had sent a letter of condolence to the Director-General of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). In that letter the SSA Director-General raised the issue of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Agency and the Service.

#### 2. Reply by the Dorector-General of NISS

Consequent to the letter, the Director-General has replied requested that the Head of Station be consulted on the proposed dates of the meetings, first the experts meeting on the 29 November 2012, followed by the Senior officials meeting on the 5 December 2012. The first round of meetings will take place in Addis Ababa, FDRE. The Head of Station agreed to the proposed dates and has since sent the letter for attention.

On the Analysts' exchange visits to discuss the issue of human trafficking, human smuggling as well as the terrorism, NISS is of the opinion that the Analysts meeting be held back until the draft MoU has been agreed upon in principle as it would guide the way forward on areas of cooperation.

#### 3. Conclusion

The Head of Station request the Divisional Head NF23 to consult with the Division on Counter-Terrorism to establish whether it can wait until the meeting on the MoU takes place. If the situation warrants immediate contact with NISS, it is requested that it be indicated.

Thank you. End.

SECRET 1

#### SECRET





| Liaison Contact         | L670                  |       |  |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------|--|
| SASS Member/s Involved  | Head of Station       |       |  |
| Unit                    | NF22/2                |       |  |
| Date of Contact         | 23 October 2012       |       |  |
| Place of Contact        | South African Embassy |       |  |
| FIS Member/s            | NISS Head of Liaison  |       |  |
| FIS Members Positions   | NISS Head of Liaison  |       |  |
| Type of Contact         | Operational           | X     |  |
|                         | Social                |       |  |
|                         | Telephonic            |       |  |
|                         | Other (Specify)       |       |  |
| SSA Requested Contact   | Yes:                  | No: X |  |
| Documents: a. Requested | None                  |       |  |
| b. Exchanged            | None                  |       |  |

#### 1. Background

The Station received a message J044 from Head Quarters at about 20H30 on 22 October 2012.

#### 2. The Developments

#### a. Meeting with the Ambassador at about 21H15

On receipt of the message, the Head of Station in consultation with the Deputy Head of Station decided that the Ambassador of South Africa to the African Union and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia be informed for information of the situation. After receiving the briefing from the Head of Station, the Ambassador decided to brief the African Union Commission Chairperson and also informed her that there might be some changes in the protection arrangements and the State Security Agency is handling the matter.

#### b. The Contact with the NISS Head of Security

The Head of Station attempted at about 20H38 to call the NISS Head of Security but could not get through to him and left a request to call him back. The NISS Head of Security responded to the request by the Head of Station to call him at about 21H47. The head of Station requested a beef-up of security of the AUC Chairperson.

The Head of Station was at Sheraton Hotel at about 06H30 this morning and can confirm that there was a beef-up on the security. A V8 back-up vehicle is provided with four security personnel.

#### c. Meeting with Head of NISS Liaison

At about 08H30 on 23 October 2012, the Head of Station met with the Head of NISS Liaison. The Head of NISS Liaison requested more details on the development so that appropriate measures can be put in place. The Head of station could not provide further details because message J044 indicated that 'Until further notice no details (names) must be shared with the host Service.

SECRET 1

#### 3. Conclusion

It is requested by the Station that a determination be made on how soon the names should be shared with the host Service as it wants to avoid any diplomatic embarrassment if anything takes place.

Thank you.
 End.





## State Security

State Security Agency
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

COUNTER TERRORISM

ALAZEERA

### SCOPE

- Introduction
- The identity of
- Links to the Natalie FAYE WEBB incident
- Associates/ other individuals of concern
- Travel data of individuals

AL A TO E E RA

#### INTRODUCTION

The SSA Counter Terrorism Unit is currently conducting an investigation into South African citizens and foreigners supporting Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda Operations in East Africa.

The following individuals has travelled extensively to East Africa (early 2000 up to recently) and in some instances made use of alternative routes such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi to access Somalia and other countries in East Africa.

One of the individuals identified as Ahmad forms part of this group.

ALAZEERA CTU 2012

### IDENTITY OF

- In memorandum dd. 17/10/2011 from the SSD an individual number was identified.
- Linked to Al Qaeda
- was in contact with Faadil Abdullah Muhammad @ Harun Fazul
- Linked to planned terrorist attacks in South Africa (two conferences)

AL AZEERA

provided by other Foreign Intelligence Services Additional Information on fought alongside the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 in Somalia was wounded during this time and taken by a certain Ibrahim to Kenva for stayed at the residence of treatment (linked to the Kampala bombings). in Somalia in 2006. were with and in Somalia- he met a Debriefing of arrested on (From Zimbabwe) while he was in Somalia was from certair Indian decent and got injured when his car was bombed. (AO operative) that fled Kenya in 2007 after a foiled terror attack n SA stayed with delivered military equipment to Al Shabaab in 2008.

The identified mobile number belonged to


Date of birth: ID number:

Passport number

- linked to Natalie Faye Webb
- Close associate of
- Travelled frequently to the Emirates and East Africa
- Made use of a false passport to travel to East Africa in 2011

CTU 2012

### **NATALIE FAYE WEBB 8**



- GRANT named Natalie Faye WEBB as one of the key South African operatives planning attacks against Kenya.
- December 2011- liaison information indicated that Natalie Faye WEBB (SA stolen identity) is suspected to be involved in Al-Shabaab operations (in charge of logistics, especially housing and transport in a planned attack targeting Kenya. The liaison reports further indicated that it is suspected that Natalie Faye WEBB could also be identified as Samantha Louise LEWTHWAITE or Asmaa Shahidah BINT-ANDREWS. (widow of 7/7 suicide bomber, Jermaine Lindsay)

CTU 2012

Investigations revealed that:

- was identified as hat fled Kenya in December 2007 after he was sought for planned terrorist attacks.
- During WEBB's stay in South Africa (2009-2011) she was employed at Crown Pies family business of Her financial statements revealed the main contributor to her account was Crown Pies.
- past travel together with to East Africa has in the

DOB:

ID:

DOB:

ID:

Passport:

Owner and driver of the vehicle

Close associate of

that transported WEBB and

ALAZEERA CTU 2012

Date of birth:

ID number:

Passport numbers:

Caught in Somalia end 2006 together with other foreign fighters

Close associate of

Travelled on a false passport to East Africa in 2011

ALJA TEERA



Date of birth:

ID number:

Passport numbers:

Travelled on a false Namibian Passport to Somalia (March –June 2011) Involved in facilitation of travel documentation

was accused of being the sponsor of the two individuals for alleged terror related and were arrested activities.

CTU 2012

Date of birth:

ID number:

Passport numbers

Closely associated with

Travelled to East Africa and the Emirates

AL AZEERA

Date of birth:

ID number:

Passport numbers:

Closely associated with

Travelled to East Africa and the Emirates

ALIA CTU 2012 E E RA

Travel data

09/01/2004 depart to Dubai: EK762 10/02/2004 return to SA: EK763

04/11/2006- EY604 (Abu Dhabi) 10/06/2007 KQ460 return to SA via Kenya)

18/12/2008 depart SA to Tanzania: SA 188 30/12/2008: Tanzania to Kenya 26/01/2009 return through Beitbridge POE NO RECORD OF LEAVING KENYA

> ALAZEERA CTU 2012 E E RA

**Travel data** 

ont...

27/02/2009 depart SA to Dubai: EK 764 07/03/2009 arrive SA from Dubai: EK763

13/06/2010 depart EK 766 Dubai 23/06/2010 arrive SA EK 765 Dubai

17/07/2010 depart EK 764 Dubai 16/08/2010 arrive EK 765 Dubai

07/12/2010 depart EK 762 Dubai 25/12/2010 arrive SA from Tanzania

26/04/2012 depart Dubai EK762 04/05/2012 return to SA EK765

CTU 2012

ID no:

Passport

Travelled to Tanzania on 22 February 2011
Returned to South Africa on 20 June 2011

ALIAZEERA CTU 2012

Travel data:

23/10/2001 Depart EK 464 (Dubai) 06/11/2001 arrives SA (EK 463- Dubai)

21/06/2002 departs SA with EK464 (Dubai) 17/07/2002 arrives SA with EK763

22/01/2004 leaves for Dubai: EK 764 9/02/2004 returns from Dubai: EK 761

> ALAZEERA CTU 2012 E E RA

Travel data:

cont..

09/09/2006 leaves for Abu Dhabi on EY 604 return 16/09/2006 to SA from Abu Dhabi

30/10/2006: leaves Abu Dhabi: EY604 05 /11/2006 return to SA from Abu Dhabi: EY604

22/03/2008: Depart to Abu Dhabi: EY 603 08/04/2008 return to SA: EY 600

AL A TU 2012 E E RA

Movement recorded on 17/02/2011 at Beitbridge-Port of Entry between South Africa and Zimbabwe Return on 22/02/2011 from Tanzania to South Africa

CTU 2012

departed to Tanzania on 12/02/2011
Returned to SA on 19/06/2011

AL A CTU 2012 E E RA

25/01/2002: leaves for Dubai: EK464

08/03/2002: return to SA: EK465

AL AZEERA

Other identities of

ALAZEERA CTU 2012

Travel data of

01/22/2004 depart Dubai: EK 761

22/01/2004 enter SA: EK 764

09/11/2006: Depart to Abu Dhabi EY604

16/11/2006 return to SA:EY603

05/02/2011 depart SA for Abu Dhabi: EY 601

12/2/2011 return SA: EY 602

22/02/2012 depart to Dubai- EK764

26/03/2012 arrive SA EK 766

CTU 2012 E F A

Travel detail of

Probable dates travelled to/from Abu Dhabi: 2012-03-02 (EY602)

A TOTU 2012 E E FORM

THANK YOU

AL A TEERA



# State Security

State Security Agency
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

**COUNTER TERRORISM** 

OPFRATIONAL ASSESSMENT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF

Assessment based on information received from various Foreign Intelligence

Services and debriefings on also identified as In order to provide perspective on this information it would be compared with source information as well as travel analysis of


#### in **SOMALIA**

- According to FIS info,
   Union (ICU) in 2006 in Somalia
- was wounded during this time and taken by a certain Ibrahim to Kenya for treatment. During this time was allegedly hosted at the residence of (linked to the Kampala bombings).
- FIS information further indicated that and were with in Somalia in 2006.
- Source information indicated (dd June 2007) that was not seen at for a long time because he was away fighting in Afghanistan.

  During this period it was also reported that personnel at Sniper Africa remarked that lost a lot of weight. reportedly ascribed the weight loss to a serious bout of illness.




When comparing this information with period (2006/2007) it is interesting to note that departed on 04/11/2006 for Abu Dhabi and only returned on 10/06/2007 from Kenya. (NOTE: the close proximity/ overlapping of md travels to the Emirates - Abu Dhabi in this period)



- According to the debriefing of Somalia- he met a certain (From Zimbabwe) while he was in Somalia.
   was from Indian decent and got injured when his car was bombed.
- According to they were taken to a training camp near Kismayo and on 30 December 2006 transported by boat to Ras Komboni together with other foreigners -some injured. From Ras Komboni they were driven to a forest near the Kenyan border where they were ambushed by Ethiopian army. indicated that they fled deeper into bush and that dragged himself further into bush. and some individuals stayed behind and was arrested on 09 January 2007.
- FIS information indicates that and delivered military equipment to Al Shabaab in 2008.
- According to travel records and travelled to East Africa during 2008.

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- During SWC 2010 information received indicated that two South Africans;

  associates of
  - QA East Africa facilitator aka facilitated
    equipment to Somalia. It was further stated that (AQ operative)
    that fled Kenya in 2007 after a foiled terror attack stayed with and
    close associates of According to this
    information married a white widow with two children
- was through reconstruction and comparative analysis identified as according FIS information had together with Natalie Faye WEBB and entered Kenya on 26 February 2011 with a vehicle ( belonging of
- of has in the past travel together with / to East Africa.

Came to South Africa end of December 2007, beginning been dormant for 20 years

married a white widow with two children.

The identity was re-activated in May 2008 after been dormant for 20 years

the husband of Natalie Faye WEBB. When WEBB came to South Africa in 2009 she had two children

WEBB was employed at the shop owned by family members of

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#### LINKS TO NATALIE FAYE WEBB

- According to the FIS information received Natalie Faye WEBB (stolen identity) is suspected to be involved in Al-Shabaab operations (in charge of logistics, especially housing and transport in a planned attack in 2011 targeting Kenya). The liaison reports further indicated Natalie Faye WEBB could also be identified as Samantha Louise LEWTHWAITE or Asmaa Shahidah BINT-ANDREWS.
- Jermaine GRANT a close associate of WEBB was arrested in December 2011 in Kenya over claims of links to terrorism. Police found and seized materials (similar to those used by 7/7 suicide bombers: chemicals, batteries and an electric switch) that is used in making bombs in his rented apartment.
- During a debriefing session GRANT named Natalie Faye WEBB as one of the key South African operatives planning attacks against Kenya. He further indicated that SA authorities foiled a planned attacked in 2010.


- Samantha Louise LEWTHWAITE a British national that was married to the Jermaine LINDSAY- 7/7 suicide bomber came to South Africa on 18 July 2008 and was deported to the UK on 16 June 2009. According to information LEWTHWAITE then changed her personal details and acquired a passport in the name of Asmaa Shahidah BINT-ANDREWS. BINT-ANDREWS entered South Africa on 02 September 2009 and presumably assumed a stolen identity of WEBB that was activated on 30 October 2008 on the DHA system.

# DEBRIEFING NOTES OF FINANCIER ARRESTED IN APRIL/MAY 2011)


QA

- According to he met (A South African, Indian appearance, aged using cell no in the Deira area in Dubai at the end of 2008. came to the UAE on a visitor's visa he obtained from a travel agency.
- told that he was tasked by (AQ) Harun Al Fadul (Harun Fazul) to go to the UAE and meet up with to obtain financial support to carry out a bomb attack in SA that would involve five suicide bombers indicated that the operation was in planning since 2007 and required funding up to 1 million dollars.

- old that he was unable to give him the money but that he will do his best and that it would take a long time. asked to find a way to send a message to UBL and ask him for support. went to Somalia and returned a month later to Dubai to meet up with and gave an envelope to that contained a message from Harun Fadil to UBL. indicated was handling administration of the operation with
- The cell phone number that was provided by some belongs to
   Apart from the cell phone number, travel history correlates with the mentioned dates and the locality of the supposed meetings. At that stage was staying in South Africa- presumably at



- further indicated that he went to Tanzania with
  early 2010 to meet up with the South African and
   the Ugandan. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss sending
  weapons to jihadi opposition to the Ugandan Government. According to
  was accompanied by two South Africans eligiously committed,
  full beard and member of AQ) and very religious, beard and member of
  QA)
- Again travels correlate with the date and location of the said meeting. It is further of interest that accompanied during March 2010.



- According to he again met together with in Dubai. stated that their discussions was about getting support for the SA operation (planned attack against Jewish conference in Cape Town), as well as setting up communication with AQ in Afghanistan utilising This meeting that was described by again correlates with the travel of to Dubai departed for Dubai on 13/06/2010 and returned on 23/06/2010 to South Africa.
- REMARK: While no information is available to draw any comparison or inferences between these meetings and the events that took place during 2010 in South Africa it does give some perspective on incidents like the meetings and the


During March- May 2010 and in some instances attended several meetings- amongst others the meeting.

Reports in 2010 on the activities relating to the boat indicated that the had a conversation on the yacht with his contacts and where they claimed that Allah gave them the best boat. In one conversation told and hat 'Allah' gave them the boat' and they received the training, now is the time to practice.

appeared to be either of Middle-Eastern or East African origin-had a distinct Arabic accent. gave the impression that he was the 'leader' among the three individuals working on the boat.

- stated that while he was in Tanzania early 2011 on his way back from Kenya and Somalia he met the South African in the Tsoma hotel in Dar Es Salaam. The reason for the meeting was to discuss the situation of the people in Somalia. told that the organisation in Somalia was not in a good state because of personal disputes between its members.
- further indicated to that he has met them and that they asked him not to represent them abroad. told that pointed a revolver at him because he was displeased with him.
- After that left the hotel and returned with a person called (Fadl HARUN (Harun FAZUL) HARUN asked to tell him what happened in Somalia. HARUN then said he would put a stop to and his behaviour as he (HARUN) is from AQ and was the Secretary General of AQ in Afghanistan

- asked about the response of AQ in Pakistan to the message that was previously sent told that he would follow-up with gave an e-mail address that he could contact him if there was a message from AQ. communicated once in April 2011 with and that was when wanted to know if there was a message from AQ in Pakistan regarding the SA operation.
- This meeting compares with \_\_\_\_\_\_movements during the said period.
   departed for Tanzania on 27/01/2011 and returned 12/02/2011 to South Africa.



- A point to note is that soon after the alleged meeting of
  Harun FAZUL in Tanzania early 2011, WEBB,
  arrived in Kenya on 26 February 2011. Another noteworthy incident is
  the laptop that was found containing amongst others SAPS identity cards (with the
  personal detail of and with Harun FAZUL and Musa DHEERE
  when they were killed on 08 June 2011. According to information FAZUL also had a
  South African passport with him in the name of Daniel Robinson- ID number:
  Passport number: 427650742. The passport photo was that of Harun FAZUL
- If it is taken into consideration that FAZUL and has met early 2011 in Tanzania it could explain how it came that FAZUL was in possession of the laptop with the SAPS ID card of as well as the false South African passport.

#### CONCLUSION

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- From an operational perspective this information opens some lines of investigation and hypotheses in terms of the mentioned planned attacks during 2007- 2010 (that did not materialised) as well as future planned attacks that could still be executed.
- The information further indicates an Al Qaeda (AQ) presence in South Africataking into consideration that is a close associate of that has been link to AQ since 2002. Natalie Faye WEBB and close associates of are linked to QA-related activities. Jermaine GRANT has mentioned in one of his debriefing sessions that s the second highest ranking AQ member in South Africa.

THANK YOU

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