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## State Security

State Security Agency  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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S.A.S.S.	

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### Development Since the Alert on the Possible Assassination of the Chairperson of the African Union Chairperson (AUC)

#### 1. Introduction

The alert was received by the Station on the 22 October 2012. Following the consultation with the Deputy Head of Station, the Head of Station informed the Head of Mission (HoM) on the possible developments. A request to increase the security of the Chairperson of the AUC was also requested to the Security Department of the National Intelligence and Security Service of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE).

#### 2. The Basis of Informing the HoM

In FDRE there are two 'Safe Havens' to which South Africans can be taken to in the event of any emergency situation that would require evacuation as a result of threat to lives of the individuals. These are [REDACTED]

Upon receiving the alert which indicated that the assassins were in Addis Ababa from the 12 October 2012 to carry-out the assignment on the 24 October 2012, it was felt that the assassins could carry-out the assignment at anytime in the interim period to the 24 October depending on when the opportunity prevails for them. The 23 October 2012 was observed as a critical day for the operation hence the HoM would have to put in place the necessary conditions for the environment to receive the Chairperson of the AUC at the official residence.

The analysis of the information at hand was that the executors of the assignment may have been ahead in planning the operation. The available time would also not allow the Host Service an opportunity to neutralise the operation. This required alternative arrangements to be in place for any eventuality.

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### **3. Liaison of the Request with NISS**

The Head of NISS Security Division responsible for the safety and security of the VVIP in FDRE was requested to increase the security of the Chairperson as there was an eminent threat to her. This was done telephonically. The Head of NISS Security Division responded positively and promptly increased the security of the Chairperson of the AUC.

### **4. Liaison of the Information with NISS**

On the 23 October 2012, an instruction was received to the effect that the Station should liaise with the Host Service the names of the assassins and request that prompt action be undertaken to neutralise the assignment with the possibility of arresting the assassins. The information was discussed with the Head of Liaison of NISS at about 17H00.

On the 25 the Acting Director of State Security Agency: Foreign Branch (SSA:FB) received a feedback from the Head of the Foreign Service of NISS to the effect that:

- The names were searched and it has been found that no such names could be linked with individuals in the Republic of Sudan (RoS);
- He also indicated that in their assessment the RoS would not carry-out such operations in FDRE as RoS paid dearly in the attempted assassination of Egypt former President MUBARAK;
- All ports of entry were checked as well as the border areas between FDRE and RoS and there was no record of suspected RoS nationals entering FDRE.

However, the threat is handled with utmost seriousness and follow-up is being done to clear all potential possibilities on the potential assassination of the Chairperson of the AUC.

### **5. Conclusion**

The Station is following-up with NISS on the development on whether any new information has been found. So far no new information has been received regarding the assassins. The developments on the situation will be monitored and a close liaison with NISS on the matter will be carried-out on daily basis.