



## state security

State Security Agency  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

### *Liaison Information Report*

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GENERAL MANAGER CI10  
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MANAGER CI20

#### **LS825 (MOSSAD): LIAISON MEETING: 23 OCTOBER 2012**

Venue: Liaison Centre  
Time: 10:00  
People Involved: [REDACTED] CI10  
[REDACTED] LI10  
[REDACTED] Head of LEVANT desk, FB  
[REDACTED] Head Africa, LS825  
[REDACTED] Non-residential representative of LS825  
[REDACTED] Liaison Officer, SSA

#### **1. BACKGROUND**

- 1.1 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were picked up at the Centurion Protea hotel at 9h00. They wanted to have a short meeting before leaving for Musanda. It was the first time since the initial meeting [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED]. He enquired what format the meeting will take as well as who will be present. On sensitizing them that a photo will be taken at the gate, [REDACTED] said he got to the conclusion that the SSA was much more security conscious than LS 825. He said once they were accompanying a guest, the guest was free to move with the member freely.

#### **2. CONTACT DETAILS**

- 2.1 LI10 opened the meeting by welcoming LS825 and said the meeting was to formally introduce the two parties to each other. He said the initial contact did not unfold well,



seeing the SSA was not sure if they indeed were talking with members from LS825. The protocol demanded by the SSA was that any representative of a FIS would formally introduce himself by way of handing over his credentials to the host country. This showed respect for the host country and the relationship could start on an equal and pleasant basis. The do's and don'ts is usually also explained during such a meeting. Due to circumstances this however did not happen and almost resulted in tarnishing the relationship before it even began. LI10 requested the letter of introduction from [REDACTED]. He reacted by saying it was in the process of being signed by the DG, LS825. [REDACTED] indicated to LI10 that she did say it was a pre-requisite for the meeting. LI10 manage to handle the situation quite diplomatically, but firmly, saying the letter is urgent and needs to accompany him the next time. [REDACTED] (CI10) was introduced for further comments.

- 2.2 He reiterated what was said by LI10 and said a liaison relationship starts gradually and both parties find an equal basis to work from. The SSA needs co-operation with LS825 on pre-decided topics and is ready to work together with LS825 on the following topics:
- Counter Terrorism (CT)
  - Counter Proliferation (CP)

CI10 further said the SSA has its own pressing issues inside the country and has limited resources and must focus on those issues. If information is shared in time and communicated fully it will assist the SSA to respond better on requests. If the liaison relationship stays within the rules of the game, good co-operation could be expected from the SSA.

- 2.3 [REDACTED] requested some time to respond. He said they did come to the meeting in good faith and almost admitted he was out of order the previous time. He explained how he came about calling the DG, SSA. (This was reported in an earlier report). He also said when the relationship between the two countries broke down; most of the organisational memory was also lost in the process. A lot of changes in both organisations have since taken place.

LS825 also had limited resources in Africa and need to cover the whole of Africa. They have the mind set of working where the co-operation is best and where the production shows promise.

- 2.4 During May 2012 it came to the attention that an imminent attack was planned in Africa, spearheaded by HIZBOLLAH with Iran as backing. This information was collaborated by Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Ghana and Botswana. The attack was planned against either or the USA, Israel, UK and Saudi Arabia. The individual did proceed to Zambia and on to Mozambique and was supposed to enter South Africa from there, while traveling on the name of aka [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] He was then apparently warned that his position was known and entered South Africa illegally or on another name. He apparently left South Africa with a new name and the question is who supported him in South Africa with his planned operation. It could be of use to check if an individual with the name [REDACTED] came into the country or left sometime between mid to end May 2012. His real name has now been established as [REDACTED] (All possible spellings) and if it could be established that a person by that name departed from South Africa during the above-mentioned timeline. To further establish any contacts in South Africa as well as passport stamps in his passport, all of the above could be of great assistance and support.

As a result of this operation where South Africa also played a very important role, Iranian officials were arrested in Kenya with explosives. Many African countries feel betrayed by Iran in using their countries to build and execute terror attacks against foreign tourists and embassies.

On the managing of the HOS in Israel, [REDACTED] said why they found it difficult was that they were mostly busy in Africa and sending emergency information through the HOS, meant first sending the information to the head office. He indicated again that they will be guided by the SSA as they were guests in South Africa and see how they can better the situation.

- 2.5 CI10 replied that the SSA was ready to work together on these issues, and could be motivated by more comprehensive information from the start and to include them in the whole picture from the inception. It is always better to respect the right operational channels and if LS825 is mindful of the constitution of South Africa co-operation will be good. If more information could be communicated in time which will enable the SSA to position their operations and resources according to the need.
- 2.6 [REDACTED] said it was very clear and believed their challenges in Africa was Iran and the proliferation of weapons, the use of HIZBOLLAH on the continent to their advantage, HAMAS and the obtaining of weapons via Sudan to the Gaza strip, especially missiles and AK'47s. With the peace process in Sudan weapons are smuggled to Gaza. The other priorities to LS825 in Africa are M23, Al SHABA'AB and GLOBAL JIHAD. He highlighted the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD with their agenda in the whole of Africa and especially in the North and Horn of Africa as well as Togo, Ivory Coast, Mali from Libya and the Darfur and Eritrea region. Many of these weapon smuggling routes are also people smuggling routes. He said it was terrible how these poor people were treated on these routes.



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2.7 LI10 reiterated the significance of the introduction of a representative and to ensure the same treatment that he enjoys in South Africa be granted to the HOS in the other country.

2.8 [REDACTED] agreed and said plans should be made to arrange for an analysts' exchange on the topics agreed upon. The HOS in Israel could be engaged in managing this as soon as [REDACTED] meets with him.

## 2. COMMENTS BY LIAISON OFFICER

2.1 The two LS825 members were taken back to the hotel and stated they were glad that the air has been cleared. They experienced the meeting as to the point, but felt positive regarding the future co-operation between the services.

2.2 The liaison officer was requested by [REDACTED] to have a meeting on 25 October 2012 to recap what was said and the way forward. She met him at the hotel at 19h00. In the meeting [REDACTED] indicated she will forward requests through the FB, HOS. [REDACTED] said he planned to visit sometime in November 2012 and will let [REDACTED] know in advance.

2.3 The following documents were handed over:

- Weekly Middle Eastern Intelligence
- South Africa Overview
- Iran/Nuclear/Program Status
- Syria/Political Situation Picture Correct to 2 October 2012

All the above are attached, as well as the pictures and details obtained from the main gate at Musanda.

2.4 The report serves to inform CDCI that contact with a member of FIS was made.

[REDACTED]  
LIAISON OFFICER

## 3. COMMENTS BY LI10

3.1

[REDACTED]  
GENERAL MANAGER: LIAISON AND PROTOCOL SERVICES